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ABSTRACT: The legal reasons that bind a judge and the moral reasons that 
bind all persons can sometimes pull in different directions. There is perhaps no 
starker example of such judicial dilemmas than in criminal sentencing. 
Particularly where mandatory minimum sentences are triggered, a judge can be 
forced to impose sentences that even the judge regards as “immensely cruel, if 
not barbaric.” Beyond those directly harmed by overly harsh laws, some courts 
have recognized that “judges who, forced to participate in such inhumane acts, 
suffer a loss of dignity and humanity as well.” 
 
When faced with such a judicial dilemma—a powerful tension between the 
judge’s legal and moral reasons—the primary question is what a judge can do 
to resolve it. We argue that the two standard responses—sacrificing morality to 
respect the law (“legalism”), or sacrificing the law to respect morality 
(“moralism”)—are unsatisfying. Instead, this Article defends an underexplored 
third response: rather than abandoning one ideal to maximally promote the 
other, we argue that judges should seek to at least minimally satisfy the 
demands of both. Judges should, in other words, look for and employ what we 
dub Satisficing Options. These are actions that enjoy sufficient support from 
both the legal reasons and the moral reasons, and thus are both legally and 
morally permissible—even if the acts in question would not strictly count as 
optimal by the lights of the law or morality.   
 
This common sensical response to the problem is not only 
underappreciated in the literature, but also has great practical import. Focusing 
on the sentencing context, this Article demonstrates that judicial dilemmas can 
be systematically resolved, mitigated or avoided through a range of concrete 
strategies that on their own or in conjunction can constitute Satisficing 
Options: these strategies include seeking out legally permitted but morally 
preferable interpretations of the law, expressing condemnation of unjust laws 
in dicta, and seeking assistance or cooperation from other actors to help 
defendants facing substantively unjust mandatory sentences. While these 
strategies can at times also go too far, we argue that in certain contexts they 
can be sufficiently defensible on both legal and moral grounds to be a 
justifiable response to judicial dilemmas. This Article thus provides both a 
novel theoretical framework for understanding the justification of judicial 																																																								
* Associate Professor (Reader), University of Surrey, School of Law; J.D., University of Michigan Law 
School; Ph.D. University of Massachusetts, Amherst; B.A. Cornell University.  
** Assistant Professor, Virginia Tech, Department of Philosophy; Ph.D., Princeton University; LL.B. 
(Law), The University of Sydney, B.A. The University of Sydney. (Authors are ordered alphabetically, 
and are equally responsible for the content.) The authors would like to thank Stephen Bero, Stephen 
Galoob, William Most, Vanessa Reid, and Connie Rosati for extremely helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this article. 
 RESOLVING JUDICIAL DILEMMAS [10-03-17] 	1 
responses to unjust laws, as well as a practical a menu of options which judges 
can use to guide their responses to the judicial dilemmas that they are 
increasingly likely to encounter within our criminal justice system.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1989, Andres Magana Ortiz illegally entered the United States of 
America. 1 He was fifteen. In the three decades since he has led a quiet, 
productive, responsible life: he ran a successful coffee business in Hawaii, 
married a U.S. citizen, and fathered three children (all of whom are U.S. 
citizens).2 On March 21, 2017, the U.S. government ordered Ortiz to report for 
removal in the next month.3 Ortiz applied for a stay from the district court, and 
when that was denied he appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.4 His appeal was also denied.5  
 
Judge Reinhardt’s concurring judgment in this decision was remarkable. 
He noted that “the government conceded during the immigration proceedings 
that there was no question as to Magana Ortiz’s good moral character”,6 that 
Ortiz is “currently attempting to obtain legal status on the basis of his wife’s 
and children’s citizenship, a process that is well underway,”7 and that it “was 
fully within the government’s power to once more grant his reasonable 
																																																								
1 Magana Ortiz v. Sessions, No. 17-16014, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. May 30, 2017) (Reinhold, J. 
concurring) (available online: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/05/30/17-
16014.pdf).  
2 Id. at 4-5. 
3 Id. at 5.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 6. 
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request” for a stay.8 In denying that request, “the government forces us”—that 
is, the judges and the court—“to participate in ripping apart a family”:9 
 
We are unable to prevent Magana Ortiz’s removal, yet it is contrary to the 
values of this nation and its legal system. Indeed, the government’s 
decision to remove Magana Ortiz diminishes not only our country but our 
courts, which are supposedly dedicated to the pursuit of justice. Magana 
Ortiz and his family are in truth not the only victims. Among the others are 
judges who, forced to participate in such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of 
dignity and humanity as well. I concur as a judge, but as a citizen I do 
not.10 
 
Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence is remarkable in three respects. First, for 
how clearly it outlines the injustice of Ortiz’s deportation. Second, for how 
candidly it discusses the complicity of the courts and “judges who, forced to 
participate in such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and humanity.”11 
Finally, the decision is remarkable for the media attention it received, and the 
role it may well have thereby played in leading to the Department of Homeland 
Security to grant Ortiz an 11th hour reprieve of 30 days on June 6 2017.12  
 
Judge Reinhardt and his colleagues on the Ninth Circuit faced what we will 
call a judicial dilemma: a choice scenario in which a powerful tension arises 
between the judge’s moral and legal reasons, with each group appearing to pull 
toward a different course of action. Regardless of whether you think the right 
resolution of this case was clear, we take it that there are many cases that are 
aptly described as judicial dilemmas. The central issue we will tackle in this 
paper is: Can judicial dilemmas be adequately resolved, and if so how? 
 
Our first task in pursuing this issue will be to clarify what a judicial 
dilemma is. We will offer an account of the conceptual structure of judicial 
dilemmas below: briefly, our view is that judicial dilemmas are cases where 
the option for judges that is morally best (i.e. most supported by the moral 
reasons) comes apart from the option that is legally best (i.e. most supported by 
the legal reasons). A virtue of this account is that it is maximally general. As 
we show, it is compatible with a wide array of theoretical accounts of judicial 
dilemmas in the literature. Moreover, it does not just apply to, say, 
immigration law. This matters because judicial dilemmas can arise in a variety 																																																								
8 Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 7-8. 
11 Id.  
12 Safia Samee Ali & Maria Paula Ochoa, Coffee Farmer Gets an 11th Hour Extension on Day 
of Deportation, NBC NEWS (June 7, 2017) (http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/coffee-
farmer-gets-11th-hour-extension-day-deportation-n770051). Shortly after the reprieve ended in 
July, Ortiz was deported. William Cole & Susan Essovan, Kona Farmer says goodbye to 
family ahead of deportation, HONOULU STAR ADVERTISER (July 8, 2017) 
(http://www.staradvertiser.com/2017/07/08/breaking-news/kona-coffee-farmer-says-goodbye-
to-family-ahead-of-deportation/). 
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of areas of law. In fact, they are perhaps most pervasive in criminal contexts, 
where judges are frequently forced to make morally questionable decisions, 
especially in cases involving mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. 
Indeed, a decade ago, Judge Reinhardt himself lamented that such a provision 
required him to affirm a 155-year sentence that he described as “immensely 
cruel, if not barbaric.”13  
 
To frame our discussion, let us focus on United States v. Angelos—a 
similar judicial decision by a trial court—as our paradigm example of a 
judicial dilemma. In 2002, Weldon Angelos, a 22-year-old man with no 
criminal record, sold $350 worth of marijuana to a police informant on three 
occasions.14 During two of these deals he was in possession of a Glock.15 
When he was arrested, marijuana and further handguns were found in his 
apartment, and in police searches of other locations.16 Mr. Angelos was offered 
a plea bargain that recommended a prison sentence of 15 years.17 He was told 
that if he refused the offer, he would be charged with further offenses, 
including five counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug 
trafficking crime in violation of § 924(c), which in total could leave Mr. 
Angelos facing over 100 years of mandatory prison time.18 
 
He refused the plea.19 At trial, he was convicted of 13 drug, firearm, and 
																																																								
13 United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (Reinhard, J., concurring). In this 
case, Judge Reinhardt issued a concurring judgment that affirmed the “immensely cruel, if not 
barbaric” 155-year term of incarceration for Marian Hungerford, because this sentence was the 
mandatory minimum set by the relevant statutory provision (section 924(c)). Id. at 1120. 
Hungerford was an impecunious, unemployed 48-year-old woman who had no criminal record 
and suffered from a severe form of Borderline Personality Disorder. Id. at 1119. She was 
convicted of seven violations of section 924(c) for her “extremely limited” role in conspiring 
in and aiding and abetting several armed robberies—she had never held a gun. Id. Judge 
Reinhardt’s judgment in Hungerford illustrates one type of strategy for resolving judicial 
dilemmas: he expressed his condemnation of the law he was legally required to enforce. See id. 
at 1118-23. And in both cases, this strategy may have helped to yield welcome results. After a 
settlement agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Hungerford was subsequently 
resentenced to a 7-year term of incarceration that Chief District Judge Richard Cebull 
described as “no more or less than necessary” for her convictions. See Clair Johnson, Judge 
cuts 159-year sentence in casino robbery case, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Oct. 27 2010) 
(http://billingsgazette.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/judge-cuts--year-sentence-in-casino-
robbery-case/article_9c4c5966-e1e4-11df-b934-001cc4c03286.html). Indeed, Hungerford’s 
resentencing and release from prison perhaps partly resulted from the language in Reinhardt’s 
concurrence, but it is more likely, in the words of U.S. Attorney Mike Cotter, that this “just 
conclusion” was “the result of extraordinary efforts” by Judge Cebull, along with Hungerford’s 
attorney Daniel Wilson and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jim Seykora.  Id.  
14 United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d, 433 F.3d 738 
(10th Cir. 2006). 
15 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.  
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 1231-32. 
19 Id. at 1232. 
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money laundering offenses, as well as three violations of § 924(c).20 In 
November 2004, Judge Paul Cassell of the U.S. Court for the District of Utah 
sentenced Mr. Angelos to “a prison term of 55 years and one day, the 
minimum that the law allows.”21  Judge Cassell himself described this sentence 
as “unjust, cruel, and even irrational.”22 So why did he impose it? 
 
Because he had to. Although the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommended 
a sentence of 78-97 months’ imprisonment for the 13 offenses under other 
provisions besides § 924(c),23 Judge Cassell was bound by statute to add to this 
55 additional years for the firearms offenses under § 924(c). 24  Section 
924(c)(1)(A) provides that  
 
any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime…uses or carries a firearm…shall, in addition to the 
punishment provided for such crime…be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than 5 years.25 
 
Furthermore, Section 924(c)(1)(C) ratchets up the mandatory minimum 
sentences for subsequent violations of the statute:  
 
In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, 
the person shall…be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less 
than 25 years.26 
 
Thus, Mr. Angelos’s three violations of § 924(c) carried an additional 
minimum sentence of 55 years: five years for the first violation of this section, 
and 25 additional years for each of the subsequent ones.27 Cassell was deeply 
troubled by the severity of this required sentence in light of Mr. Angelos’s 
comparatively minor misconduct, 28  and reduced the sentence for the 13 
offenses under other statutes from 78-97 months to just a single day.29 But this 
still left the additional 55 years’ imprisonment for the three § 924(c) violations. 
Moreover, the court was compelled to reject Angelos’s constitutional 
challenges to his sentence: both his argument that the sentence made “arbitrary 
classifications” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause,30 and his argument that the sentence was cruel and unusual in violation 																																																								
20 Id. at 1232 (“The jury found Mr. Angelos guilty on sixteen counts, including three § 924(c) 
counts: two counts for the Glock seen at the two controlled buys and a third count for the three 
handguns at Mr. Angelos' home.”).  
21 Id. at 1230. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1232. 
24 Id. at 1230 (finding that “this 55–year additional sentence is decreed by § 924(c)”). 
25 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
26 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C). 
27 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. 
28 Id. (stating that the court believed the sentence to be unjust, cruel and irrational).  
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 1235; see generally id. at 1239-56.  
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of the Eighth Amendment.31 
 
Judge Cassell’s long and painstaking decision is evidence of the intractable 
dilemma he felt he faced. On the one hand, Judge Cassell’s legal reasons 
required him to impose the applicable mandatory minimum sentence. The law 
was relatively clear on this point. But on the other hand, Judge Cassell also had 
weighty moral reasons32 not to impose a punishment that was, in his own 
words, “unjust, cruel, and even irrational.”33 Intuitively, over half a century of 
incarceration is disproportionate to the severity of Mr. Angelos’s offense 
conduct; as the court noted, his minimum sentence is more severe than the 
maximum sentences for a number of violent offenses.34 This disproportionality 
is, on many views, sufficient to make Angelos’ sentence is unjust.35 Moreover, 
during his 55-year prison term, Mr. Angelos will be deprived of liberty, social 
standing and his right to vote.36 He will be exposed to unacceptably high risks 
of serious sexual abuse,37 and he could face the torturous conditions of solitary 
confinement for arbitrary reasons.38 This is not to mention the harms Mr. 																																																								
31 Id. at 1256-60. 
32 As we explain in Part I, there are several possible grounds or sources of these moral reasons. 
The harm to the defendant clearly is one. But another might be the duty to avoid being 
complicit in injustices done by others. Thus, a judge faced with a case like Angelos would 
plausibly have weighty moral reasons to avoid being complicit in the injustice of applying 
overly stringent mandatory minimum laws to a defendant such as Mr. Angelos. 
33 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. 
34 Id. at 1245, ftn. 88 (comparing the minimum sentence for Angelos (738 months), to the 
maximum sentences for a kingpin of a major drug trafficking ring in which death resulted (293 
months), an aircraft hijacker (293 months), a terrorist who detonates a bomb in public 
intending to kill bystanders (235 months), and a second-degree murderer (168 months)). 
35 Proportionality principles are widely endorsed in the philosophical literature on punishment. 
See Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2013).  
36 American Bar Association Task Force, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 3RD ED., 
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 7 
(2004) (available online: 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/
crimjust_standards_collateralsanctionwithcommentary.authcheckdam.pdf) (“convictions will 
expose [defendants] to numerous additional legal penalties and disabilities, some of which may 
be far more onerous than the sentence imposed by the judge in open court. These “collateral 
consequences of conviction” include relatively traditional penalties such as 
disenfranchisement, loss of professional licenses, and deportation in the case of aliens, as well 
as newer penalties such as felon registration and ineligibility for certain public welfare 
benefits”); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 142 (2011) (“Once labeled a felon, 
the badge of inferiority remains with you for the rest of your life, relegating you to a 
permanent second-class status); id. at 158 (“Forty-eight states…prohibit inmates from voting 
while incarcerated for a felony offense [and the] vast majority of states continue to withhold 
the right to vote when prisoners are released on parole. Even after the term of punishment 
expires, some states deny the right to vote for a [long] period….”). 
37 For the sake of simplicity, let’s crudely assume that the probability of Angelos’ being 
sexually abused in any given year is equal to proportion of prisoners who were sexually abused 
in 2011-2012 (4%), and that if Angelos is abused in any given year he will be abused as many 
times as the average victim in 201-2012 (4 times). 4% of 63 multiplied by 4 is 10.08, which is 
a crude estimate of how many assaults he can be expected to sustain during his incarceration. 
38  Tim Heffernan & Graeme Wood, The Wrong Box, NAT. REV. (April 20, 2015) 
(https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/416339/wrong-box); Atul Gawande, Hellhole, 
 RESOLVING JUDICIAL DILEMMAS [10-03-17] 	6 
Angelos’s punishment imposes on others—such as the $1.3 million bill to the 
taxpayer.39 It is unclear that these harms are counterbalanced by, say, the 
deterrent effects of Mr. Angelos’s punishment, since drug trafficking is 
notoriously difficult to deter.40 
 
Of course, this only shows that laws imposing such mandatory minimums 
are themselves often unjust. Skeptics of judicial dilemmas may point out that it 
is still possible that judges also have weighty moral reasons to apply the law 
even when it is unjust. In some cases, it might be that a judge’s all-things-
considered moral duty is to obey even certain unjust laws. Nonetheless, we 
contend that sometimes the balance of a judge’s moral reasons might require 
him not to apply specific immoral laws that are beyond the pale, in which case 
there would be a genuine conflict between the balance of the judge’s moral 
reasons and the balance of his legal reasons.41 A case like Angelos is about as 
good a candidate for such a scenario as can be found in this country.42 So we 
will continue to treat it as our paradigm example of a judicial dilemma.  
 
Cases like Angelos and the dilemmas they raise merit particular scrutiny. In 
part, this is because the conflict between judges’ moral and legal reasons, as 
noted, is especially stark in criminal contexts involving mandatory minimums. 
But it is also warranted for two other reasons. First, judges have shown great 
ingenuity in exploring practical solutions to this type of judicial dilemma, so 
considering what judges have done or could do in criminal contexts is a 
profitable way to investigate what judges could do to resolve judicial dilemmas 
in other legal contexts. The second reason is that we think judicial dilemmas in 
criminal contexts, and in particular in criminal sentencing, are likely to become 
more pervasive in the near future. This is due in part to Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions’ Memorandum to Federal Prosecutors on May 10, 2017.43 Sessions’ 																																																																																																																																																		
THE NEW YORKER, (March 30, 2009) 
(http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole).  
39 As Judge Myron Bright of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in United States v. 
Hiveley 61 F.3d 1358, 1363 (8th Cir. 1995), mandatory minimums require “excessively long” 
sentences that “not only ruin lives of prisoners and often their family members, but also drain 
the American taxpayers of funds which can be measured in billions of dollars.” 
40 Estimates of this effect “are all over the place.” Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Mass Incarceration: 
The Silence of the Judges, N.Y. Rev. Books (May 21 2015) 
(http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/05/21/mass-incarceration-silence-judges/). Still, 
evidence does show that deterrence is largely ineffective vis a vis drug trafficking. See, e.g., 
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug Trafficking and 
Organized Crime: Concepts and Practicalities, International Drug Policy Consortium (Feb. 
2013) (https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/drug-law-enforcement-
felbabbrown.pdf). 
41 Regardless of whether one thinks a judge’s moral and legal obligations can literally come 
into conflict, at the very least there often is a powerful tension between judges’ moral reasons 
not to do injustice by applying unfair mandatory minimum laws, on the one hand, and their 
legal reasons to apply the law as written, on the other. 
42 It is easy to imagine even more clear-cut examples from Nazi Germany, for instance. But 
our focus is the existing U.S. legal system. 
43 Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III, Memorandum For All Federal Prosecutors on 
Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017) 
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memo directs federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, 
readily provable offense.”44 That instruction marks a significant departure from 
efforts by former Attorney General Eric Holder to restrict federal prosecutors 
from applying harsh mandatory minimum sentencing provisions to non-violent 
drug offenders.45 Accordingly, judges appear likely to encounter the sort of 
judicial dilemmas we analyze in this Article, in cases very much like Angelos, 
with increasing frequency in the years to come.  
 
Some might quibble about whether Angelos really poses a judicial 
dilemma, strictly construed. While there is an interesting theoretical question 
about what constitutes judicial dilemma, which we address at length below, do 
not let this theoretical question distract from the crucial, but too often 
neglected practical question: How, if at all, should judicial dilemmas be 
resolved? This practical question arises as long as one thinks judicial dilemmas 
arise in systems like ours. It is this practical question that will be our primary 
focus in this Article.  
 
There are some responses to this crucial question which we will not discuss 
at length, because we think that they are inadequate in important respects. One 
such response is to pass the buck by insisting that judges cannot resolve such 
dilemmas; only Congress can. We agree that the best state of affairs would be 
one in which Congress prevented judicial dilemmas from arising in the first 
place via legislative reform. For instance, Congress could abolish mandatory 
minimums altogether, preventing judges like Cassell from facing judicial 
dilemmas in criminal sentencing. Although Congress came close last year to 
reaching an agreement that would remove or reduce mandatory minimums for 
many non-violent offenders, the bipartisan criminal justice reform effort 
appears to have stalled in the wake of the recent Presidential election.46 Thus, 
we assume that Congress, given the current political climate, is unlikely to 
remove even the harshest mandatory minimums for the time being. This leaves 
judges with the important, unanswered question of what to do in the interim in 
response to judicial dilemmas in the criminal context.  
 
Another inadequate response is for judges to opt out of facing judicial 
dilemmas by resigning in protest. Some judges have done just this, and such 																																																																																																																																																		
(http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/05/12/ag.memo.on.department.charging.and.sentenc
ing.policy.pdf).  
44 Id.  
45  Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., Memorandum For All Federal Prosecutors on 
Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 19, 2010) 
(https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/criminal_defense_topics/essential_topics/sentencing_res
ources/clemency/holdermemo.pdf).  
46 Justin George, Can Bipartisan Criminal-Justice Reform Survive in the Trump Era?, THE 
NEW YORKER (June 6, 2017) (http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-bipartisan-
criminal-justice-reform-survive-in-the-trump-era) (“Last year, reformers on both sides agreed 
to support a proposed [federal] law that would relax mandatory minimum sentences,” but 
“[t]he bill stalled, then died.... (…) [A]s the contentious Presidential election neared its 
conclusion, the alliance started to come undone. (…) Since President Trump took office, the 
strain on the coalition has only intensified.”).  
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acts of protest can send a valuable message that reform is needed.47 We raise 
some concerns about resignation as a response to judicial dilemmas below. But 
even if one is not persuaded by these responses, at the very least we think 
resignation is not a generalizable response to judicial dilemmas. If our legal 
system is to function at all, let alone function well, some officials must decide 
cases like Angelos. So the important question remains: what should those 
judges do when confronted with judicial dilemmas?  
 
Our view about how judges should navigate judicial dilemmas in cases like 
Angelos is best understood in terms of how it departs from, and is more 
satisfying than, the two most obvious remaining responses. One option is for 
judges to be “legalists”, and just do whatever is legally best—to obey the law, 
pure and simple—despite the moral considerations to the contrary. Another 
option is for judges to just do what is morally best—which may well involve 
disobeying the law, perhaps in surreptitious ways—despite the legal 
considerations to the contrary. Each of these options requires the judge to 
sacrifice a standard that she is deeply committed to, be it morality or law. In 
contrast to both of these options, our view is that judges should seek to 
satisfice the demands of both morality and law: that is, to perform actions that 
are both morally and legally permissible, even if those actions are somewhat 
sub-optimal according to both morality and the law. We dub such responses 
Satisficing Options.48 Although they may not be the very best alternative either 
by the lights of the law or by the lights of morality (i.e. enjoy maximal support 
from the moral reasons or the legal reasons), these Satisficing Options would 
still be good enough by the lights of both law and morality. 
 
The fundamental problem we address is an instance of the core question in 
professional ethics generally: what should officials do when their general and 
role-based duties conflict? Some, like Prof. David Luban, allow that role-based 
duties must “be balanced against the moral reasons  for breaking  the  role,” 
and officials should be “willing to deviate” from their role-based duties when 
doing so is required by moral “common sense”.49 For others, like Prof. Bradley 
Wendell, the duty to be faithful to the law must be stronger than officials’ 
duties to do justice in particular cases, so that the legal system fulfills its 
fundamental roles of resolving social disagreements and providing equal 
treatment of citizens before the law.50 As these arguments illustrate, much of 
the discussion in this literature is focused on whether officials (typically 
lawyers, rather than judges) should be moralists or legalists; the availability 																																																								
47 See Nicole Hong, John Gleeson, Prominent Brooklyn Federal Judge, to Step Down, WALL 
ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan 4, 2016) (http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/01/04/john-gleeson-prominent-
brooklyn-federal-judge-to-step-down/). 
48 See infra note 63 (discussing the origins of the term “satisficing”). 
49 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) at 125, and David 
Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 673 (2012) at 688.  See also David Luban, 
Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-course Corrections to Lawyers and 
Justice, 49 MD.   L.  REV. 424 (1990), and ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR 
ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999) 
50 See BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010). 
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and assessment of Satisficing Options is neglected.  
 
We think this is unfortunate. The existing focus, we suggest, is due largely 
to a climate in which the natural response to a judicial dilemma would be to 
maintain that a judge can’t do anything but apply the law—often referred to as 
the “judicial can’t”.51 We contend that the “judicial can’t” rings hollow as a 
response to judicial dilemmas. Our basis for this contention is not the bold 
claim that the demands of morality are paramount, as moralists like Robert 
Cover famously argued in relation to antebellum judges applying the Fugitive 
Slave Act;52 rather, we make the mundane and in many ways more dialectically 
important complaint that there is a great deal more that judges can do in 
addition to “applying” the law. This reveals the limitation of Wendell’s 
defense of fidelity to law as a fully general response to judicial dilemmas: if 
there are Satisficing Options, there is much more that judges can do to promote 
justice in particular cases without violating their arguably stronger official, 
role-based duties. It is thus an advantage of our approach that it allows us to 
defend Satisficing Options that are morally and legally permissible, and that 
resolve judicial dilemmas, without requiring us to settle all debates in legal 
ethics between legalism and moralism, Luban, Wendell, Cover, and their many 
interlocutors. 
 
Of course, our view would be of little interest if there are no Satisficing 
Options. If that were the case, judges would still face a hard choice between 
legalism and moralism. That would be a significant blow to our view. Given 
this, perhaps the most important task in this Article will be to explore what 
Satisficing Options look like in the context of mandatory minimums. In 
particular, we will consider five possible satisficing strategies: interpretative, 
expressive, assistive, cooperative, and suggestive strategies. These strategies 
can be pursued independently or in tandem. We think they are generally worth 
exploring, even if they may ultimately prove unworkable in particular cases.  
 
These strategies differ along two dimensions: first and foremost, in the type 
of activity that they require of judges, and second, in whether and how that 
activity involves interaction with other legal actors (such as the executive 
branch, prosecutors, or jurors). The first two strategies can be implemented by 
judges acting independently. Interpretative strategies involve seeking creative 
and legally permissible, if suboptimal, interpretations of the law to support 
more morally attractive legal outcomes. Expressive strategies involve applying 
the law while expressing condemnation of its iniquitous features. The 
remaining three strategies involve interaction with other legal actors. Assistive 
strategies involve advocacy on behalf of harmed parties to legal agents outside 
of the courts system, such as calling for the executive to pardon defendants like 
Mr. Angelos. Cooperative strategies involve collaborating with other legal 
actors within the court system to seek morally acceptable outcomes, and may 																																																								
51 See Scott Shapiro, Judicial Can’t, PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES (2001) 11(1), especially at p. 532 
52 ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975), at 
199-122.  
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require legally permissible but suboptimal acts to create incentives for actors 
such as prosecutors to collaborate. Finally, suggestive strategies involve 
nudging other actors within the legal system—as opposed to collaborating with 
them—so that they independently use their discretion to produce a morally 
preferable solution of their own accord. For example, judges might seek out 
legally permissible, if admittedly suboptimal, means to prompt juries to 
consider nullifying the law in cases like Angelos. 
 
We will discuss the extent to which each type of strategy genuinely counts 
as a Satisficing Option on its own, or perhaps in tandem with the other 
strategies that we listed above. To be clear, we do not defend the ambitious but 
implausible view that such Satisficing Options will be available in every 
instance of a judicial dilemma. As such, we do not claim that this Article offers 
an exhaustive answer to the question of what judges should do to resolve 
judicial dilemmas. Perhaps some judges will be stuck choosing between 
moralism or legalism; we cannot rule that out. However, we think that the 
Satisficing Options we discuss are quite widely available in a variety of legal 
contexts, and where they are available they constitute the judge’s best prospect 
for safely navigating the risks posed by judicial dilemmas. As such, our view 
offers significant progress towards answering our central question.  
 
The order of business will be as follows. In Part I, we provide a precise 
account of the conceptual structure of the conflict between judges’ moral and 
legal reasons where mandatory minimums are concerned. We map out the 
sources of the obligations at issue and explain how they interact. We then 
provide a clearer account of the type of Satisficing Options we favor, and 
explain why they constitute a resolution of the judicial dilemma.  
 
In Part II, we then discuss the five types of strategies just mentioned, which 
judges have employed or could employ in response to judicial dilemmas. We 
consider each one in relation to criminal cases involving mandatory minimum 
sentencing provisions. For example, in such contexts, the interpretive strategy 
might involve construing applicable Constitutional provisions in creative ways 
to soften the impact of mandatory minimums, while the cooperative strategy 
may involve delaying proceedings in extreme cases to coax prosecutors into 
dropping certain excessive criminal charges that carry harsh mandatory 
minimum sentences that are out of place in the case at hand. For each of the 
five strategies, we discuss the extent to which they actually amount to a 
Satisficing Option of the sort we favor. Our hope is that this Part will offer a 
partial menu of concrete options for judges to consider when they see a judicial 
dilemma on the horizon.  
 
In Part III, we consider the biggest source of opposition to our advocacy of 
Satisficing Options: that they constitute, or risk, intolerable erosions of the rule 
of law. We agree that protecting rule of law values is of great moral 
importance. As such, strategies which are morally preferable along some other 
dimension (for instance, by promoting justice to particular defendants) might 
ultimately be morally impermissible if they constitute a sufficiently serious 
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violation of the rule of law. However, we contend that this does not rule out at 
least some of the strategies that we consider, because (a) our advocacy of these 
strategies can be restricted in simple ways that significantly attenuate concerns 
about the erosion of rule of law values, and (b) in some contexts, the strategies 
that we advocate on balance promote rule of law values.   
 
Finally, the Conclusion briefly draws out some lessons from the foregoing 
discussion of the various strategies judges might adopt in the face of judicial 
dilemmas involving mandatory minimums. Our contention is that while there 
may be no silver bullet for resolving any and every judicial dilemma that 
arises, adopting a combination of some of the above strategies would go a long 
way toward mitigating the injustice of mandatory minimums while allowing 
judges to sufficiently comply with both their moral responsibilities and their 
legal duties. Rather than making legal sacrifices to attain moral perfection or 
making moral sacrifices to attain perfection in the eyes of the law, we submit 
that judges facing judicial dilemmas should chart a middle course: Seek out 
options that are at least sufficiently good by the lights of both morality and law. 
Perfection is the enemy of the good, as the old saying goes. This is true not 
only for statesmen and craftsmen, but, for judges facing judicial dilemmas too.  
 
I. THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF JUDICIAL DILEMMAS 
 
To ground and clarify the subsequent discussion it will help to proceed 
with an account of the conceptual structure of judicial dilemmas, and a 
corresponding account of what it takes to resolve a judicial dilemma. We will 
provide accounts of each in this section. Section A offers a rough sketch of the 
conceptual structure of judicial dilemmas and our favored approach to 
resolving them, while Section B refines this account and Section C considers 
crucial theoretical questions about the framing device we use to explain how 
judicial dilemmas operate. Finally, Section D provides an overview of the 
strategies for resolving judicial dilemmas we will explore in depth.  
 
A. A Simple Model of Judicial Dilemmas and How to Resolve Them 
 
Any passably precise account of such topics will inevitably have to draw 
on framing devices that will be somewhat controversial; but most of the 
framing devices we employ here are not ones we are especially firmly wedded 
to, so we should not be distracted by such controversies. Our subsequent 
arguments can be easily translated into other analytical frameworks, or subject 
to different interpretations, and we are happy to adopt a different conceptual 
structure should it prove more advantageous.  
 
Our central framing device, then, will be the notion of a reason: a 
consideration that counts in favor of an action.53 We will also appeal to the 																																																								
53 See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS (VOL. 1) 1 (2011) (“Facts give us reasons 
when they count in favour of our having some belief or desire, or acting in some way. When 
our reasons to do something are stronger than our reasons to do anything else, this act is what 
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now familiar distinction between moral and legal reasons.54 We will not offer 
an account of this distinction as we wish to be ecumenical, but some 
illustrative examples can be used to glom on to these intuitive notions. That a 
child is starving overseas is a moral reason to give to charity, but not a legal 
reason to give to charity; the law is silent on private philanthropy. By contrast, 
there are strong legal reasons not to open someone else’s mail (doing so can be 
a felony)55 even if the letter is clearly just an unwanted ad and opening it 
would be morally innocuous (or at least trifling). Moral and legal reasons thus 
come apart.56  
 
If moral and legal reasons come apart, it is at least conceptually possible 
that one can face decisions where what is morally best (i.e. most supported by 
the moral reasons) and what is legally best (i.e. most supported by the legal 
reasons) come apart by non-negligible margins. When judges face such 
decisions in determining whether to obey or disobey the law, they face a 
judicial dilemma.  
 
We can make this more precise in two stages: the first clarifies the structure 
of a judicial dilemma and the second elucidates what it is to resolve a dilemma. 
To begin with, then, we can represent the two most obvious actions that a 
judge might take in cases like Angelos. Some scholars—the moralists—argue 
that judges should engage in disobedience in such cases. This is what Jeffrey 
Brand-Ballard calls “lawless judging”: it can involve willfully misinterpreting 
and misapplying unambiguous laws to reach morally preferable outcomes 
(perhaps only in the view of the judge).57 In claiming that judges should 
sometimes engage in disobedience, moralists in effect argue that judges should 
do what is morally best even if it is legally worst. In the terminology we adopt, 
this option can be labeled disobedience. Other writers—the legalists—might 
advocate for what we will call pure obedience. J.D. Mabbott, for instance, 
famously argued that punishment is a “purely legal issue”, such that judges 
should simply apply the law when punishing any particular defendant, and 
that’s it. Judges ought to do so because it is legally best, regardless of the 																																																																																																																																																		
we have most reason to do, and may be what we should, ought or must do.”) (emphasis 
omitted); THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). 
54 For an extensive discussion of the role legal reasons can play in understanding other legal 
notions such as precedent, see John Horty, Rules and Reasons in the Theory of Precedent, 17 
LEGAL THEORY 1 (2011); JOHN HORTY, REASONS AS DEFAULTS (2012). For more general 
discussion of ‘legal reasons’, and how they may differ from ‘moral reasons’, see Scott Shapiro, 
What is the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006), and SCOTT SHAPIRO, 
LEGALITY 184-88 (2011). But see David Enoch, Reason-Giving and the Law in OXFORD 
STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 16-19, ftn. 28 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) 
(arguing that there is nothing special about legal reasons); and cf. Scott Hershovitz, The End of 
Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L. J. 1160, 1194, ftn. 55 (2016).  
55 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (defining the crime of “obstruction of correspondence”).  
56 We take this position to be intuitive, but not entirely uncontroversial. To say that moral and 
legal reasons come apart is to take a stand against the view that legal reasons just are moral 
reasons one has because of the law. (This is simply the analog of Greenberg’s view about legal 
duties. See Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L. J. 1288 (2014).)  
57 JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING (2010). 
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moral reasons at play.58  
 
For the sake of the argument, let’s grant the moralist that disobedience is 
morally best, and let’s grant the legalist that pure obedience is legally best. 
Now we can represent (a simplified instance of) the structure of a judicial 
dilemma by representing how these options are evaluated according to moral 
and legal reasons on a scale of 0 (worst) to 10 (best): 
 
 DISOBEDIENCE PURE OBEDIENCE 
MORAL REASONS 10 0 
LEGAL REASONS 0 10 
 
If a judge faced a decision with this structure, we think that there is an 
intuitive sense in which neither the moralist nor the legalist offers a 
satisfactory way to resolve the dilemma. Indeed, if a judge is forced to choose 
between these options, her position is tragic: she is doomed to score terribly 
according to one standard that she is deeply committed to: morality or law.  
 
Of course, judges rarely if ever face decisions quite like the one above. 
This representation of a judicial dilemma is too simple in two main respects. 
First, there are more (moral and legal) reasons at play than the simple table 
above suggests. In particular, morality is obviously not wholly opposed to pure 
obedience, and—less obviously—the law is not wholly opposed to some 
disobedience. Thus, on the one hand, there are plenty of familiar moral reasons 
for judges to apply the law, which may even give judges a prima facie moral 
duty to apply the law (even when it is somewhat unjust).59 On the other hand, 
philosophers such as Brand-Ballard have emphasized that there are legal 
considerations that at least can militate in favor of some disobedience, such as 
the judicial oath to do justice.60 Moreover, a judge might face a conflict 
between different provisions of law. For instance, the judge might be 
convinced that a particular statute is unconstitutional, although this position 
might have been rejected by a higher court. This is another way in which one 
might contend that the judge takes there to be legal reasons in favor of 
disobedience.61 In light of this, a more accurate representation of actual judicial 
dilemmas might be this:  
 
 DISOBEDIENCE PURE OBEDIENCE 
MORAL REASONS 10 4 
LEGAL REASONS 2 10 
 																																																								
58 J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 152-54 (1939).  
59 M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L. J. 950 
(1973). 
60 BRAND-BALLARD, supra note 57; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Limits of Judicial Fidelity to 
Law: The Coxford Lecture, 24 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 305 (2011). 
61 Of course, the law judicial system provides a safe outlet in such cases: namely, the option 
for the judge to write a dissenting opinion rather than engage in outright disobedience of the 
higher court’s ruling. 
 RESOLVING JUDICIAL DILEMMAS [10-03-17] 	14 
Notably, even in such messier decision contexts, it is still the case that one of 
which is morally best but legally worst, and vice versa. So this complication 
makes the picture of a judicial dilemma more accurate, but not less concerning: 
moralistic views still demand that judges perform acts that are worst according 
to legal reasons, and mutatis mutandis for legalistic views and moral reasons. 
Neither choice resolves the dilemma.  
 
The second way in which the above tables are too simple is that there often 
are more options available than doing what is morally best or what is legally 
best. For instance, instead of obeying or disobeying the law, judges can simply 
resign at an earlier point in time. This is frequently recognized, but widely 
disparaged: it does not resolve the dilemma, because it just avoids the 
dilemma. To illustrate this, consider a putative instance of a moral dilemma: a 
young Frenchman during World War II might have to choose between staying 
at home to help his ailing mother and leaving home to join the frontlines of the 
French Resistance.62 The Frenchman could avoid (rather than resolve) this 
dilemma by choosing to do neither: he could commit suicide. Judicial 
resignation is in some ways not unlike suicide. The judge faces a hard choice 
between two options that are supported by different reasons. Resignation just 
allows the judge to opt out of the system and avoid that hard choice. (There are 
also moral reasons that militate against resignation: it depletes the pool of 
conscientious and competent judges, for example.) We will ignore resignation 
in what follows, as we want to consider options that resolve judicial dilemmas.  
 
This takes us to the second stage of our framework: conceptually, what is it 
to resolve a judicial dilemma? A central contention in what follows will be that 
there are options—alternatives to disobedience, pure obedience, and 
resignation—that resolve judicial dilemmas. What does that mean? 
 
Think of moral dilemmas once more. Imagine that the young Frenchman 
had a third option: he could live in a house on the outskirts of his village where 
he could (a) support the resistance to a slightly lesser degree by, say, secretly 
printing pamphlets and (b) frequently check in on his ailing mother. This is not 
as good for the Resistance, or as good for his mother. But plausibly, it is good 
enough for both: it satisfices both types of demands but does not maximize 
either.63 This, we claim, would resolve his moral dilemma.  
 
Likewise, we think that if there is an option that satisfices judges’ moral 
and legal reasons, that would resolve judicial dilemmas even if that option is 																																																								
62 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND THE HUMAN EMOTIONS 24-26 (1957). 
63 H.A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCH. REV. 129, 
129-38 (1956) (introducing, for the first time, the notion of satisficing). The term is also 
widely used in the philosophical literature on consequentialism. See, e.g., Micahel Slote and 
Philip Pettit, Satisficing Consequentialism, 58 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 
139-76 (1984); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2015) (discussing arguments for and against satisficing consequentialism). Our 
view does not rely in any way on the truth of satisficing consequentialism. We merely draw 
inspiration from the very basic concept underlying these theories. 
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neither morally nor legally optimific. Such an option need not be best by the 
lights of morality or law, but it is good enough by the lights of both. 
 
Indeed, there might be several such options in a given case. After all, we 
might think most real life cases present range of options on a continuum 
between pure legal obedience and pure disobedience. Typically, there will be a 
range of actions judges can take where some conflict less flagrantly with the 
law than others. For instance, a decision that flatly contradicts the text of a 
statute might be far towards the pure disobedience end of the spectrum, while 
stretching a statutory term beyond what might seem natural may still amount to 
disobeying the law, but in a less flagrant way that lies closer to the obedience 
end of the spectrum.  Thus, a more realistic picture of a judicial dilemma might 
be this: 
 
 
We take it to be intuitive that if there are Satisficing Options, then there is 
an important sense in which judges ought to take them.64 Crucially, we do not 
claim that judges ought to take this option because they must maximize the 
satisfaction of moral and legal reasons. This view that one ought to “maximize 
all reasons” might be one possible view that some might endorse, but we do 
not.  In other words, we do not defend Satisficing Option B in the table above 
because its total score (16) is greater than the total for Satisficing Option A 
(15), or Pure Disobedience (12) or Pure Obedience (14). To defend such a 
claim we would have to supply some account of how we can meaningfully 
compare and aggregate moral and legal reasons on a single scale, and we are 
not confident that such comparisons can be meaningfully made.65 Rather, our 
claim is that judges ought to take such options because they are good enough 
by the lights of both the relevant normative standards that judges ought to take 
seriously in judicial deliberations: this only requires that we make meaningful 
comparisons between moral reasons and moral reasons, and between legal 
reasons and legal reasons; it does not require comparisons between moral and 
legal reasons. Accordingly, one important motivation for focusing on 
Satisficing Options as a distinct approach to resolving judicial dilemmas is that 																																																								
64  One might ask: in what sense of “ought”? Morally, the judge ought to engage in 
disobedience and legally the judge ought to engage in pure obedience (ex hypothesi). One way 
to resolve this issue that we are attracted is to claim that the answer is: rationally the judge 
ought to take a Satisficing Option. We think this answer is plausible so long as we have a 
specific sense of rationality in mind. See, e.g., Amelia Hicks, Moral Uncertainty and Value 
Comparison, OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS (Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., forthcoming). 
65 Ruth Chang, Value Incomparability and Incommensurability, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
VALUE THEORY (Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, eds., 2015). 
 PURE 
DISOBEDIENCE 
SATISFICING A SATISFICING B PURE 
OBEDIENCE 
MORAL 
REASONS 
10 8 7 4 
LEGAL 
REASONS 
2 7 9 10 
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one can identify them without needing to compare, aggregate or trade off 
moral and legal reasons against each other. Satisficing Options can be 
identified even if moral and legal reasons are not strictly commensurable: All 
one needs to do is to ask which actions sufficiently meet the demands of the 
law, considered alone, and sufficiently meet the demands of morality, 
considered alone. 
 
Thus, our view is that if both Satisficing Options A and B in the above 
table are good enough by the lights of the law and good enough by the lights of 
morality, then either Satisficing Option A or Satisficing Option B could be a 
defensible way to resolve the judge’s dilemma. That is, assuming either one 
would pass muster under both of the applicable normative standards the judge 
is committed to (perhaps both law and morality required at least a score of 7 to 
be at least defensible), then either one could be adopted by a reasonable 
person—even if reasonable minds might differ as to whether Satisficing 
Option A or Satisficing Option B is the strictly the best resolution to the 
dilemma. Accordingly, our view is quite minimal: we claim only that if there 
are Satisficing Options (i.e. ones that fare sufficiently well both by the lights of 
the law and by the lights of morality), then judges ought to take one them. 
Further than this we will not venture here.  
 
B. Refining the Model 
 
Even this more sophisticated model of Satisficing Options is still too 
simple in crucial ways. Thus, to complete our account, note that the above 
tables misleadingly suggest that a judge encounters judicial dilemmas as 
isolated decision-points in which she considers a range of options 
simultaneously and determines which, if any, amounts to a Satisficing Option. 
In reality, a judge’s role in any given case is temporally extended: She faces a 
series of complex choices wherein what is morally best may depart from what 
is legally best. The interaction between these choices is often significant. A 
determination of the admissibility of crucial evidence at t1 can significantly 
alter the legal options available to the jury in determining whether to convict at 
t2 and thus how the judge may sentence at t3. Given this, it would be more 
accurate to say that the appropriate targets of assessment in judicial ethics 
should not be limited to single choices at particular points in time, but should 
also include sequences of such choices over time. In short, the relevant options 
display a diachronic structure.66  
 
Thus, one particular judicial action might not qualify as a Satisficing 
Option in isolation, but it could still figure into a defensible package deal that 
together amounts to a Satisficing Option. Indeed, one core component of such 
a satisficing package might be to do something that is legally and morally 
permissible, but sub-optimal, in order to avoid having to face a deeper conflict 
between morality and law at a later point in time; a somewhat loose way of 																																																								
66 This point is familiar from work on deontic logic. See, e.g., FRED FELDMAN, DOING THE 
BEST WE CAN: AN ESSAY IN INFORMAL DEONTIC LOGIC (1986). 
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describing such actions would be that they alleviate or preclude judicial 
dilemmas before they arise. In addition to seeking to resolve judicial dilemmas 
after they arise, the underlying interests and values at stake can give judges 
reason to seek to minimize the risk of encountering judicial dilemmas in the 
future. This is, of course, particularly pressing where judges have reason to 
anticipate the emergence of judicial dilemmas in discrete contexts (say, in a 
particular class of immigration cases, or with respect to sentencing or guilty 
pleas). As a result, a package of steps that together comprise a Satisficing 
Option need not involve only ex post steps to extricate oneself from an existing 
judicial dilemma, but can also incorporate also ex ante steps to block such 
dilemmas from arising downstream.  
 
Accordingly, the structure of Satisficing Options might end up being quite 
complex in practice, and nothing we say below is meant to diminish this 
complexity. In the next Part, we will present a range of possible strategies 
aimed at resolving judicial dilemmas, and we will discuss the extent to which 
they might or might not amount to Satisficing Options on their own, while also 
considering the ways in which some of them might be combined to make up a 
temporally extended sequence that constitutes a Satisficing Option. 
 
In taking the view that if there are Satisficing Options, judges ought to take 
them we also do not commit ourselves to the contentious claim that there will 
always be Satisficing Options. In the next Part, we will defend the view that 
there are often such options. Our strategy will be to focus on criminal contexts 
and identify courses of action that satisfice the moral and legal demands on 
judges, and then note that these strategies generalize to many other legal 
contexts. It could be argued that some of these courses of action are not 
genuine Satisficing Options. And it could be argued that some of the 
Satisficing Options to do not generalize to other legal contexts. We are open to 
such views about the details of our approach, as we are decidedly not trying to 
establish that all judicial dilemmas will be resolvable. Rather, we grant that 
some judicial dilemmas may well remain irresolvable despite all we say, in 
which case there remains a further question—which we do not attempt to 
answer in this article—about whether judges should prioritize morality or law.  
 
C. Defending the Presuppositions of the Model 
 
Having offered this account of the conceptual structure of judicial 
dilemmas, and of resolving judicial dilemmas, we can now say more about our 
choices with respect to the framing device of conflicting moral and legal 
reasons. Why have we appealed to moral and legal reasons rather than duties? 
Appealing to duties would perhaps be a more traditional framing device, and if 
one likes one can translate our talk of reasons into talk of duties by appealing 
to, say, Joseph Raz’s famous analysis of duties in terms of reasons. 67 
Nonetheless, we think that appealing to reasons allows for a more fine-grained 																																																								
67 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 76 (1975) (arguing that moral duties can be 
understood as exclusionary reasons). 
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analysis in at least four respects.  
 
First, there are plausible sources of moral reasons that are not plausible 
sources of moral duties. For instance, judges plausibly have moral reasons to 
maintain their own integrity, even though it is contentious that one can owe 
moral duties to oneself.68  Or perhaps judges have reasons to take some steps at 
some point to avoid judicial dilemmas (or reduce the frequency), even if they 
do not have a duty to do so on any particular occasion.  
 
Second, there are also plausible instances in which judges can fail to do 
what they have most legal reason to do without violating any legal duties. For 
instance, Hart argued that judges have “interstitial discretion” in interpreting 
ambiguous sources of law,69 and this might permit them to adopt a morally 
preferable interpretation even when other interpretations are better supported 
by legal reasons. Thus, adopting the best moral interpretation might be only 
legally second-best, but it still might not be legally impermissible. Such a 
scenario is easier to capture with reasons talk than by talking in terms of duties.  
 
Third, appealing to legal reasons renders it easier to make a detailed 
comparison between a wide array of alternatives. For instance, it may well be 
that most of the moral reasons that favor pure obedience (but not pure 
disobedience) also favor Satisficing Options, and most of the moral reasons 
that favor pure disobedience (but not pure obedience) also favor Satisficing 
Options. This would be much harder to represent clearly using talk of duties. 
Hence our talk of reasons instead.  
 
Finally, for any view about what judges should do regarding conflicts 
between morality and law there will be epistemic questions about when they do 
and do not have sufficient access to moral and legal status of different 
decisions. We will not present a full answer to that issue here, since it is a 
difficulty all theorists face equally. But our framework in terms of reasons 
rather than duties may help here, since there is considerable work on this issue 
that proceeds in terms of reasons (particularly, what it takes for an agent to 
have or possess a reason).70 On our framework, we can appeal to well-																																																								
68 See, e.g., Kurt Baier, Moral Obligation, 3 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 225 and 
n. 27 (arguing against the notion of self-regarding duties); Dennis Anthony Rohatyn, Self-
regarding Duties Again, 5 CRITICA 117, 117-19 (1971) (responding to Baier’s argument and 
defending the idea of self-regarding duties).  
69 H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 124-47 (1994) (arguing that judges have discretion to fill in 
gaps left by vague laws with an open texture); see also id. at 259 (summarizing Hart’s view 
that “courts exercise a genuine though interstitial law-making power or discretion in those 
cases where the existing explicit law fails to dictate a decision”). 
70 See, inter alia, Mark Schroeder, Having Reasons, PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 139 (2008), pp. 
57-71; What Does it Take to ‘Have’ a Reason?, in Andrew Reisner and Anglich Setglich-
Petersen (eds.), REASONS FOR BELIEF, (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Errol Lord, Having 
Reasons and the Factoring Account, PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 149 (2010), pp. 283-296, and 
The Coherent and the Rational, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, 55 (2014), 151-175, and Daniel 
Whiting, Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the a priori, JOURNAL OF 
ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, 8 (2014), pp. 1-22.  
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developed general answers to these hard questions about epistemic access; 
frameworks that proceed in terms of duties do not have this advantage. We will 
not dwell on this advantage, however; as noted, questions about judges’ 
epistemic access to what morality and the law require are a challenge on all 
views.  
 
Some might further object to our framing our discussion in terms of legal 
versus moral reasons. There is, after all, a range of theories, or interpretations, 
of the nature of moral and legal reasons. Some influential theorists like 
Professors Mark Greenberg and Scott Hershovitz contend that legal reasons are 
simply one type of moral reasons, for instance.71 So are we in trouble for 
distinguishing between moral and legal reasons? 
 
We think not. For our account of Satisficing Options and the discussion 
below of different approaches to judicial dilemmas in the sentencing context 
can straightforwardly be translated into one’s preferred view about the nature 
of legal and moral reasons. Thus, if one thinks that legal reasons simply are a 
species of moral reasons, there would be no difficulty in recasting our concerns 
entirely within the domain of morality (i.e. between two groups of moral 
reasons), rather than as a conflict between morality and law. On any such way 
of recasting our concerns, a conflict between some categories of reasons will 
remain. Some might still worry that this would make the motivation behind 
satisficing solutions to such conflicts dissipate, but we are not convinced that 
this is the case. If we take seriously that there are different types of moral 
reasons, it is far from clear that they are easily commensurable, such that it is 
appropriate to always aim to maximize the aggregate of all the applicable 
reasons. Our focus on Satisficing Options is motivated in part by the desire to 
figure out how to approach and resolve judicial dilemmas without needing the 
relevant groups of reasons to be strictly speaking commensurable or capable of 
aggregation. As a result, we think that both the underlying conflict and the 
motivations behind Satisificing Options remain intact if one interprets judicial 
dilemmas in a different way than we do or adopts some other view on the 
nature of legal and moral reasons than the one we used in framing our account 
above. This is, we think, to be expected: little of substance should hang on 
one’s choices over dispensable framing devices.  
 
D. Previewing the Menu of Satisficing Options 
 
	Let’s turn, now, to Satisficing Options themselves. In what follows, we 
will discuss the relative merits of five kinds of Satisficing Options that we 
think can resolve judicial dilemmas. We do not take a stand on which of these 
options is best, all things considered. We think many of them are compatible, 
and indeed complimentary, rather than competing. Moreover, we do not take 
ourselves to bear the burden of establishing that each and every one of the 
strategies we discuss constitutes a genuine Satisficing Option: we aim to show 
that some such options exist by charting some theoretically neglected terrain. 																																																								
71 See footnotes 49 and 51 above and surrounding text. 
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Before we discuss the details of each strategy and whether it constitutes a 
genuine Satisficing Option, let us outline them up front for the sake of clarity.  
 
The first two involve strategies that judges can successfully implement on 
their own, without the aid of other actors. First, there are interpretive 
strategies. Under this approach, the judge seeks to resolve the dilemma by 
putting in effort and creativity to seek an interpretation of the applicable legal 
materials that would be more morally attractive than the Pure Obedience 
option (i.e. applying the simplest, most legally uncontroversial interpretation, 
which might be less than morally ideal). Second, we will discuss expressive 
strategies. This approach combines Pure Obedience with actions that express 
the judge’s moral disapproval of the applicable legal regime. 
 
The next three strategies involve the judiciary interacting in different ways 
with different legal actors. Thus, the third option we will discuss covers 
assistive strategies. This approach also combines Pure Obedience with further 
actions—in this case, actions by the judge that are aimed at assisting or 
advocating on behalf of the defendants appearing before the court (or on behalf 
of other parties who are directly impacted by the judge’s decisions). This 
strategy focuses on seeking assistance for defendants or other impacted parties 
from legal actors outside the courts system: primarily, the executive.  
 
Fourth, we have the cooperative strategies. These strategies attempt to 
engage with legal actors within the courts system to cooperate in finding a 
morally preferable solution to the case at hand that nonetheless are legally 
permissible. Most obviously, a sentencing judge seeking cooperation from the 
prosecutor to impose a lesser sentence would be one example; for this strategy 
to succeed, the judge and prosecutor need to cooperate, or act in concert. In 
this context we also discuss ways in which judges can offer carrots and sticks 
to other legal actors, especially prosecutors, to ensure that they are willing to 
cooperate and collaborate in finding a legally and morally satisfactory 
outcome. 
 
Finally, we will look at suggestive strategies. This ambitious strategy also 
involves interacting with legal actors within the courts system to use their 
discretion to produce a morally preferable solution. However, cooperative and 
suggestive strategies differ because the latter do not require other agents to act 
in concert with judges. Juries, for instance, may nullify the law of their own 
accord—this is not a cooperative venture. For judges to suggestively prompt 
juries to nullify the law would be an illustrative instance of the suggestive 
strategy. This way of suggesting or nudging other legal actors is likely to be 
legally dubious or controversial at times, but nonetheless might qualify as a 
permissible Satisficing Option if it is pursued in the right way. We will discuss 
how a judge might walk this tightrope in particular practical contexts.  
 
As we will become clear, many of the strategies we consider are aimed at 
combining a strict application of the law (Pure Obedience) with other 
actions—whether extra-judicial or within the adjudicatory context—that aim to 
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promote justice in a broad sense. Other strategies we discuss involve using the 
flexibility that legal doctrine itself provides as a way to pursue morally just 
outcomes.  
 
We acknowledge that a natural concern with this project is that judges in 
principle could go too far in pursuit of morality as they see it. There are 
tremendous benefits to civil society in terms of fairness and stability that stem 
from the courts’ powerful commitment to the rule of law. Is our project in 
tension with rule of law values, one might wonder? 
 
We are mindful of this risk, to be sure. But we think it is still worthwhile to 
inquire into how far judges might go to combat clear injustices caused by laws 
that there is not the political will to remove without substantially undermining 
the rule of law. Thus, our project takes for granted a judicial climate like ours 
with a vigorous commitment to rule of law values. We think that the norms of 
judicial ethics that are widely endorsed in the U.S.72 serve as a powerful 
counterbalance to the risk to the rule of law that, in other systems, might be 
posed by judges seeking to comply with morality as they perceive it. Against 
the backdrop of widespread commitment by judges to rule of law values, 
however, there is utility in asking what Satisficing Options might be available 
to help judges adequately comply both with their legal and moral reasons when 
faced with a judicial dilemma. In other less rigorous judicial climates with a 
substantially weaker commitment to the rule of law, we would not necessarily 
endorse some of the strategies for resolving judicial dilemmas discussed in this 
paper (perhaps especially the bolder ones).73 But we are not in such a judicial 
climate. Thus, our discussion of Satisficing Options is intended to be confined 
to systems like ours where a strong commitment to the rule of law can be taken 
for granted. With this caveat, let us begin to consider the strategies judges 
might reasonably employ in order to resolve judicial dilemmas.  	
II. STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE JUDICIAL DILEMMAS 
 
A. Interpretative Strategies 
 
When faced with dilemmas between the applicable moral and legal 
reasons, the most natural strategy a judge might take to resolve it is to seek out 																																																								
72  See, e.g., Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2(A) 
(http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges#b) (“Respect 
for Law. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”). 
73 Indeed, note that where the rule of law concerns are paramount and decisively outweigh all 
other moral considerations, one might think there would no longer be any judicial dilemma to 
resolve—even if the judge believes she is faced with a somewhat unjust law. We defined a 
judicial dilemma as a case faced by a judge where what is most supported by the moral reasons 
comes apart from what is legally best. If rule of law considerations are decisive, however, then 
there would arguably be no divergence between what is morally and legally best. The morally 
best thing to do would just be to follow the best legal course of action (i.e. Pure Obedience). 
For more on the rule of law worry, see Part III. 
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a plausible interpretation of the law in the case at hand that would also be 
acceptable by the lights of morality. We call this the interpretive strategy. 
Under this approach, the judge seeks to resolve her dilemma by exerting effort 
and creativity to find an interpretation of the relevant legal materials that is 
more morally attractive than Pure Obedience. “Pure Obedience” here refers to 
the least legally controversial interpretation of the legal materials (i.e. the 
resolution that is best supported by the legal reasons), which is assumed to be 
morally problematic (i.e. is disfavored by the moral reasons). The interpretive 
strategy recommends searching for a legally available interpretation of the law 
that would yield outcomes that are significantly more morally attractive than 
Pure Obedience.  
 
To illustrate how the interpretive strategy operates in practice, we’ll 
consider in detail how it can be used in one of our core instances of the judge’s 
dilemma. In the Introduction, we saw the judge’s dilemma squarely presented 
in cases involving the troublingly harsh mandatory minimum sentences that are 
demanded by federal criminal law. To resolve this dilemma, judges might 
apply the interpretive strategy to seek out ways to avoid imposing the relevant 
mandatory minimums. Toward this end, they might entertain bold legal 
theories that provide the grounds for striking down the applicable mandatory 
minimum sentencing provisions as unconstitutional.  
 
We will discuss the prospects for two common constitutional challenges to 
mandatory minimums of the sort that were involved in Angelos. First, some 
argue that such mandatory minimums violate the Eighth Amendment ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment. Second, others argue that some mandatory 
minimum provisions are void for vagueness.  
 
These two challenges are useful for our purposes because they demonstrate 
where the line goes between legally unavailable interpretations that judges 
cannot adopt and the sort of Satisficing Option that we think judges should 
adopt. On the one hand, while striking down the provision at issue in Angelos 
under the Eighth Amendment might produce a morally desirable outcome, is 
too legally tenuous to count as a genuine Satisficing Option. It is not sufficient 
by the lights of the law.  
 
On the other hand, the vagueness challenge to the provision in Angelos has 
more going for it in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in United States 
v. Johnson, which invalidated a related provision as unconstitutionally vague.74 
In fact, there is a Circuit split about whether Johnson carries over to cases like 
Angelos and requires invalidating provisions like the one at issue there as well. 
Even if the optimal legal interpretation would recommend against carrying 
Johnson over to strike down the provision in Angelos, the Circuit split shows 
that there at least are some strong legal grounds for doing so. There is a close 
call on the legal question of whether Johnson carries over to Angelos, and so 
there would be adequate legal support for Judge Cassell to strike down the 																																																								
74 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
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provision in Angelos as void for vagueness. Since this option is significantly 
better by the lights of morality, and is also supported by strong legal 
arguments, this would amount to a Satisficing Option that we think judges 
generally should take. Accordingly, we think that Judge Cassell, if faced with a 
legally close call like this, should advert to the decisive moral reasons in favor 
of accepting a reasonable, and legally permissible, interpretation of the law that 
prevents him from having to impose the unjust mandatory minimum. We think 
this conclusion is, in fact, quite ecumenical in jurisprudence.75  
 
So as to not lose sight of the forest through the trees, let us emphasize what 
we are using the difference between these two constitutional challenges to 
illustrate. There may well be morally preferable interpretations (such as 
declaring mandatory minimums to violate the Eighth Amendment) that are 
legally impermissible because they are ruled out by binding, unambiguous 
precedential decisions or other sources of law; these are not Satisficing 
Options, on our view. These should not be conflated with morally preferable 
interpretations (such as declaring specific provisions of mandatory minimums 
to be void for vagueness) that may be legally sub-optimal, but are still legally 
permissible all the same; these are Satisficing Options, on our view.  
 
We hope that the discussion of two specific constitutional approaches helps 
to illuminate the space for legally permissible but sub-optimal interpretations. 
But in case it helps, considering a literary analogy may serve to illustrate and 
motivate the difference we have in mind. Between three possible 
interpretations of King Lear, it is possible that the first is ruled out by 
unambiguous features of the text itself, but the second is not, even though the 
third fits the text slightly better than the second. If this were the case, the 
second interpretation would be permissible (unlike the first), even though it is 
not optimal (like the third). As an interpretation, it would satisfice. Like in the 
literary case, we think there are legal interpretations that satisfice the demands 
of the law: they fit the sources well enough to be permissible even if they do 
not fit them as well as other interpretations. So long as you accept that, and you 
accept that some satisficing interpretations can be morally superior, you should 
accept that there can be interpretative Satisficing Options.  																																																								
75 So described, our position here might be read to rest on a significant assumption about the 
concept of law. Namely, it may be read to assume a form of legal positivism (such as H.L.A. 
HART, CONCEPT OF LAW), and reject a form of anti-positivism (especially that of RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)). We do not think, however, that our position rests on any 
such assumption about the concept of law. Legal anti-positivists allow that in some rare cases 
judges should disobey the law (see RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 18-19 (2006)). And 
more pertinently, anti-positivist views struggle to entirely remove legal indeterminacy (and 
hence some degree of judicial discretion between rival interpretations), for reasons that have 
been discussed at length by others (see TIMOTHY ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000)). 
Besides, as many have noted, Dworkin’s views about constitutional interpretation rest on 
implausible assumptions about the role of original intent and the ability of judges: see, e.g., 
Connie Rosati, The Moral Reading of Constitutions, in Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa 
(eds.) THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 323-337. The 
latter assumption is telling in this context; even if there is a determinate answer to what the law 
is, plausibly the difficulty of knowing it makes a variety of interpretations legally permissible.  
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1. Cruel and Unusual 
 
As seen above, although Judge Cassell found Mr. Angelos’ 55-year 
sentence to be disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense, 76  he 
determined that this punishment was not cruel and unusual in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. Could Judge Cassell have reached a different conclusion 
with regard to this challenge to the constitutionality of Mr. Angelos’ 
sentence?77  
 
As the Supreme Court recently stated, it “has struggled with whether and 
how to apply the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to sentences for 
noncapital crimes.”78 There is significant precedent, however, for the position 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits terms of incarceration that are grossly 
disproportionate to the offense charged: Solem v. Helm the Supreme Court 
declared that the imposition of a mandatory term of life imprisonment under a 
state recidivist statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment.79 The Court 
outlined a three-step test to determine whether a non-capital punishment is 
grossly disproportionate to the offense, which involves considering “(i) the 
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences 
imposed on the other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”80 
 
As the Supreme Court has noted, it has “not established a clear or 
consistent path for courts to follow in applying the highly deferential narrow 
proportionality analysis.” 81  But lower courts have largely followed the 
Supreme Court’s highly deferential approach, expressing clear unwillingness 
to invalidate state sentencing practices.82 Following the lead of the Supreme 
Court, challenges to severe mandatory minimum sentences on Eighth 
																																																								
76 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1257-59. 
77 An Amicus Brief signed by 163 individuals—including former United States District and 
Circuit Judges, former United States Attorneys, and four former Attorneys General of the 
United States—argued that Mr Angelos’ sentence constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Amici Curiae Brief at 1–2, United States v. 
Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-4282), 2005 WL 2347343. 
78 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
79 Solem v. Helm 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31-2 (2003); 
O’Neil v. Vermont 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J. dissenting); Weems v. United States 
217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910). 
80 Solem, 63 U.S. at 292. 
81 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036-37 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). See also 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (noting that with regard to the grossly 
disproportionate test, the Supreme Court has “not established a clear or consistent path for the 
courts to follow” and “precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity”).  
82 See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. MacEwan, 
445 F.3d 237, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2006); Alford v. Rolfs, 867 F.2d 1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746, 750 (Fla. 2005); State v. Harris, 844 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Tenn. 
1992); Johnson v. Morgenthau, 505 N.E.2d 240, 243 (N.Y. 1987).  
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Amendment grounds are rarely raised, and almost never succeed.83  
 
This, in fact, is why Judge Cassell determined that he was bound by 
precedent to conclude that Mr. Angelos’ sentence did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.84  In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Supreme Court upheld the 
defendant’s sentence of life in prison without parole for possessing 672 grams 
of cocaine, which was required by a Michigan statute.85  
 
Suppose now that Judge Cassell wanted to adopt the interpretive strategy 
for resolving the apparent dilemma between his moral and legal reasons. One 
move he might make is to try to distinguish Angelos from Harmelin. Thus 
perhaps Judge Cassell could have argued that Angelos involved federal 
sentencing practices, while Harmelin challenged a state sentencing regime.  
 
Why might this matter? Because of federalism. The Supreme Court to this 
point has dealt with Eight Amendment “cruel and unusual” challenges 
primarily as against state sentencing laws, but some theorists argue that 
federalism demands that courts show greater deference to state legislation than 
to federal legislation.86 Thus, a federal sentencing statute might face a steeper 
uphill battle when challenged under the Eighth Amendment than a state 
sentencing statute, given the extra deference that the latter is owed under 
federalism principles. The legal hook here is that the Eighth Amendment is 
made binding upon the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,87 and so courts implicitly apply Fourteenth Amendment rational 
basis scrutiny in determining whether state sentences (in non-capital cases) are 
grossly disproportionate to the offense. 88  By contrast, federal statutes 																																																								
83 See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 69, 87 n. 116 (2012) (“It is telling as well that some defendants sentenced to 
extraordinarily long prison terms in federal court do not even bother to challenge their 
sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 293 F. App’x 700, 
702–03 (11th Cir. 2008) (defendant sentenced to 182 years imprisonment on seventeen gun- 
and narcotic-related counts did not raise an Eighth Amendment challenge)”).  
84 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60.  
85 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
86 See Mannheimer, supra note 83 at 69 (“the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on cruel and 
unusual carceral punishments is extraordinarily deferential to legislative judgments about how 
harsh prison sentences ought to be for particular crimes. This deferential approach stems 
largely from concerns of federalism, for all of the Court’s modern cases on the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause have addressed state, not federal, sentencing practices. Thus, 
they have addressed the Eighth Amendment only as incorporated by the Fourteenth. Federal 
courts accordingly find themselves applying a deferential standard designed in large part to 
safeguard the values of federalism in cases where those values do not call for deference”).  
87 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (holding that “carrying out of the death 
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments”). 
88  See Christopher J. DeClue, Sugarcoating the Eighth Amendment: The Grossly 
Disproportionate Test is Simply the Fourteenth Amendment Rational Basis Test in Disguise, 
41 SW. L. REV. 533, 533  (“the Eighth Amendment grossly disproportionate test is simply the 
Fourteenth Amendment rational basis test in disguise. More pointedly, the precise standard of 
review applied under the grossly disproportionate test is as follows: when reviewing the length 
of a sentence under the Eighth Amendment, the court will uphold the sentence so long as it 
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challenged under the Eighth Amendment might face something less deferential 
than rational basis review. Instead, they would be subject to the Eighth 
Amendment’s own, native standard of review, which might well turn out to be 
stricter than the standard applied under the Eighth Amendment as read through 
the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. Adopting this theory, Judge 
Cassell could perhaps have concluded that a higher level of scrutiny would be 
appropriate in Angelos, such that the court need not presume that the length of 
Mr. Angelos’ sentence is constitutional.  
 
This legal theory would offer a more morally satisfactory solution to the 
judge’s dilemma in Angelos than Pure Obedience would. After all, this theory 
would avoid imposing such a harsh sentence on Mr. Angelos. However, the 
question remains of whether it is sufficiently supported by the applicable legal 
reasons to be a Satisficing Option. After all, there are other grounds besides 
federalism that could require courts to defer to even the federal legislature’s 
determination about the proportionality of sentences. For example, 
considerations about legislative competence or sensitivity to popular values 
might be adduced to justify also deferring to federal sentencing laws (and not 
just their state analogs).  
 
For that reason, we think it would at least be legally questionable if Judge 
Cassell had determined that Mr. Angelos’ sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment. It appears to be a significant departure from existing precedent.89 
For this reason, we do not think that striking down the mandatory minimum 
provision at issue in Angelos would be a Satisficing Option that offers an 
acceptable resolution to the judge’s dilemma. It is not sufficiently well 
supported by the applicable legal reasons to be a legally permissible 
interpretation. 
 
2. Void for Vagueness 
 
Matters are different, we think, when it comes to a second strategy for 
striking down mandatory minimums as unconstitutional. In particular, this is 
the argument that certain provisions triggering a mandatory minimum are 
unconstitutionally vague. In the recent case of Johnson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court endorsed just such an argument.90 There, the Court held that 
the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. 
																																																																																																																																																		
furthers a conceivable penological purpose.”). 
89  Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of 
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 117 (1993) (“in Harmelin “no member of 
the Court would interfere with a legislative grading of noncapital punishment for potentially 
violent crime. Both the concurring and dissenting opinions indicate judicial disinclination to 
review even those laws that mandate life imprisonment without any eligibility for release for 
offenses that directly threaten the physical safety of others. Hence, a legislature can be as harsh 
as it desires without crossing constitutional lines in mandating incarceration for such matters as 
possession of weapons in the commission of offenses”). 
90 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 RESOLVING JUDICIAL DILEMMAS [10-03-17] 	27 
§ 924(e), is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause.91 
This was hailed as a victory by reform-minded advocates in the fight against 
overly harsh mandatory minimums.92 It would be natural to try to build on this 
success by seeking to use Johnson as the basis for invalidating analogous 
provisions that also carry mandatory minimums—for example, the provision of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) at issue in Angelos. Let’s consider the prospects for this 
argument. 
 
Go back to Johnson for a moment. The ACCA states that any defendant 
convicted of a firearms offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) who “has three 
previous convictions…for a violent felony or a serious drug offense” must be 
“imprisoned not less than fifteen years.”93 A “violent felony” is defined as a 
crime that either contains the use of force as an element, or else “is burglary, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”94 The 
italicized phrase is the so-called “residual clause” of the ACCA. 95  The 
Supreme Court in Johnson struck down the ACCA residual clause—
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)—as unconstitutionally vague, holding that it “denies fair 
notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.”96 
 
Angelos did not involve § 924(e), which was at issue in Johnson, but rather 
another provision that contains a similar residual clause—namely, § 924(c).97 
This provision increases the defendant’s sentence by 25 years for each 
subsequent “crime of violence.”98 Moreover, the residual clause of § 924(c) 
defines “crime of violence” to include any crime “that by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another 
may be used in the course of committing the offense.”99 The italicized phrase 
here is the § 924(c) residual clause.100  
 
Now, the question is whether Judge Cassell, were he to decide Angelos 
today, would be justified in extending Johnson to cover the § 924(c) residual 																																																								
91 Id. at 2563 (“We hold that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the 
Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process.”). 
92 Families Against Mandatory Minimums, SCOTUS Strikes Down ACCA’s Residual Clause 
(June 15, 2016) (http://famm.org/scotus-strikes-down-accas-residual-clause/) (quoting 
Families Against Mandatory Minimums General Counsel Mary Price as stating that “We are 
very pleased by this decision.  All criminal laws should be clear about what conduct is 
criminal,” (…). “This is especially true when the law calls for a mandatory minimum sentence.  
Today the Supreme Court ruled (decisively) in favor of clarity in one of the harshest 
mandatory minimum laws on the books.”). 
93 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
94 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
95 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.  
96 Id. at 2557. 
97 See, supra notes 23-26. 
98 § 924(c)(1)(A)-(C).  
99 § 924(c)(3)(B) (emphasis added).  
100 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, No. 211CR00058JADCWH, 2016 WL 2901661, at *6 (D. 
Nev. May 18, 2016); United States v. Thongsouk Theng Lattanaphom, No. CR 2:99-00433 
WBS, 2016 WL 393545, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016). 
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clause as well.101 This would be tempting if Judge Cassell wanted to resolve 
his moral-legal dilemma by using the interpretive strategy. Indeed, a handful of 
district courts in the Ninth Circuit have issued decisions doing just this.102  
 
Nonetheless, some appellate courts that have considered the question have 
held that there are important textual differences between the ACCA residual 
clause and the § 924(c) residual clause that prevent the latter from being struck 
down as unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. Most notably, this argument 
was rejected by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Taylor because 
of textual differences between the two residual clauses.103 Specifically, the 
ACCA residual clause focuses on conduct that poses a “potential risk” of  
“physical injury,” while the § 924(c) residual clause mentions a “substantial 
risk” of “physical force” used in the course of committing an offense.104 The 
former phrase seems more vague than the latter, since it’s not clear what the 
ACCA meant by a potential risk (as opposed to merely a risk). Moreover, in 
principle, any type of conduct—even conduct that does not involve force 
against another (e.g. telling a lie)—could potentially risk causing physical 
injury to others, and so arguably would be a crime of violence under the 
ACCA—though perhaps not under the § 924(c) residual clause. Other courts to 
have declined to apply Johnson to § 924(c) rely on similar textual 
differences.105  																																																								
101 Note that accepting argument would in any case not have helped Mr. Angelos. Although he 
was convicted of several violations of § 924(c) and received the applicable mandatory 
minimums, the crimes of violence he committed did not qualify as such under the residual 
clause of § 924(c)(3)(B). Rather, they counted as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). 
102 See United States v. Smith, No. 211CR00058JADCWH, 2016 WL 2901661, at *6 (D. Nev. 
May 18, 2016) (extending Johnson to § 924(c)’s residual clause and striking it down as void 
for vagueness); United States v. Thongsouk Theng Lattanaphom, No. CR 2:99-00433 WBS, 
2016 WL 393545, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016) (same); United States v. Bell, No. 15-CR-
00258-WHO, 2016 WL 344749, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (same).  
103 United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376 (6th Cir. 2016) (“There are significant 
differences making the definition of “crime of violence” in § 924(c)(3)(B) narrower than the 
definition of “violent felony” in the ACCA residual clause.”). See id. at 376-77 (“Whereas the 
ACCA residual clause merely requires conduct “that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another,” § 924(c)(3)(B) requires the risk “that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Risk of 
physical force against a victim is much more definite than [the potential] risk of physical injury 
to a victim.” (internal citations omitted)). 
104 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (defining, for purposes of the ACCA, the term “violent 
felony” as one that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another”) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (defining “crime of violence” as one 
“that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property 
of another may be used in the course of committing the offense”) (emphasis added). 
105 United States v. Dervishaj, No. 13-CR-0668 (ENV), 2016 WL 1019357, at *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 14, 2016) (discussing textual differences between the two residual clauses, and holding 
that “defendants have not established that § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague”); see 
also id. *at 8, ftn. 13 (discussing other district courts that have declined to find § 924(c)(3)(B) 
void for vagueness under Johnson); United States v. Green, No. CR RDB-15-0526, 2016 WL 
277982, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2016) (“In light of the many differences between the residual 
clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B) and the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause, (…) the 
residual clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague.”).  
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Now, suppose that Judge Cassell wanted to extricate himself from the 
dilemma he faced in Angelos using the interpretive strategy. To do so, he 
would seek to minimize or explain away the textual differences between the 
§ 924(c) and the ACCA residual clauses. For example, he might assume that 
the use of the phrase “potential risk” in § 924(e) rather than “substantial risk,” 
as in § 924(c), was inartful drafting rather than the mark of an intended 
substantive difference between the two residual clauses. Adopting this sort of 
reasoning would accomplish the more morally desirable outcome of not having 
to sentence Mr. Angelos under the mandatory minimum in § 924(c). 
 
Is this interpretation sufficiently well supported on legal grounds? As it 
turns out, there is circuit split as to whether the Supreme Court’s invalidation 
of the ACCA residual clause in Johnson also requires invalidating the residual 
clause of § 924(c), at issue in Angelos. To begin with, there are several 
appellate decisions suggesting that § 924(c) is to be interpreted so that it is 
governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson. Most importantly, the 
Ninth Circuit in Dimaya v. Lynch struck down a third residual clause, which is 
practically identical to § 924(c), on the basis of Johnson.106 This, in turn, led 
some district courts in the Ninth Circuit to hold that the § 924(c) residual 
clause itself is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. 107 
 
More specifically, in Dimaya v. Lynch,108 the Ninth Circuit held that 
Johnson requires invalidating the residual clause of the definition of “crime of 
violence” that is provided in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), 
18 U.S.C. § 16(b)—despite the same textual differences that exist from the 
ACCA residual clause, § 924(e). The INA residual clause defines “crime of 
violence” to include any felony “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force.”109 The court in Dimaya held that the Johnson “Court’s 
reasoning applies with equal force to the similar statutory language and 
identical mode of analysis used to define a crime of violence for purposes of 
the INA.” 110  It concluded that “because of the same combination of 																																																								
106 Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). 
107 See United States v. Thongsouk Theng Lattanaphom, No. CR 2:99-00433 WBS, 2016 WL 
393545, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016) (“Existing authority in the Ninth Circuit compels this 
court to extend Johnson to the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)”); United States v. Smith, 
No. 211CR00058JADCWH, 2016 WL 2901661, at *6 (D. Nev. May 18, 2016) (“I find no 
basis to distinguish 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) from § 924(c)'s residual clause or Dimaya from this 
case. Though many districts outside of the Ninth Circuit have declined to extend Johnson to § 
924(c)'s residual clause, none of those courts are bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Dimaya invalidating the INA's identically worded residual provision. The binding authority in 
this circuit thus compels me to conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally 
vague.”); United States v. Bell, No. 15-CR-00258-WHO, 2016 WL 344749, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 28, 2016) (finding that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dimaya requires the court to reject 
as “not material” the textual differences between the 924(c)(3) residual clause and the 924(e) 
or ACCA residual clause).  
108 Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). 
109 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) 
110 Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1115. 
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indeterminate inquiries, [the INA residual clause] is subject to identical 
unpredictability and arbitrariness as ACCA’s residual clause,” and was 
therefore unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.111  
 
Note that the Ninth Circuit was not alone in this reasoning. The Seventh 
Circuit has also applied Johnson to strike down the INA residual clause on 
similar grounds.112 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit adopted this reasoning in 
Golicov v. Lynch, a case which expressly followed the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Dimaya.113 Thus, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits are aligned with the Ninth 
in seeing the textual differences between the INA and ACCA residual clauses 
as fairly trifling. 
 
This matters to us because the INA residual clause is basically the same as 
the § 924(c) residual clause at issue in Angelos. Neither one mentions a 
“potential risk” of “physical injury” as § 924(e) in Johnson did. Rather, the 
INA and § 924(c) residual clauses mention only a “substantial risk that 
physical force…may be used in the course of committing the offense.”114 115 
Thus, Dimaya and the other courts to reach this result about the INA residual 
clause provides persuasive authority for also invalidating the § 924(c) residual 
clause under Johnson. 
 
However, matters are not so straightforward, because some appellate courts 
have expressly rejected this argument. Most importantly, the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Hill116 found Dimaya and the other appellate decisions striking 
down the INA residual clause under Johnson to be unpersuasive given the 
textual differences between the ACCA residual clause in Johnson and the INA 
residual clause.117 Therefore, the Second Circuit declined to follow their lead 
in applying Johnson to the § 924(c) residual clause.118 Accordingly, the Second 
Circuit refused to strike down the § 924(c) residual clause as unconstitutionally 
vague under Johnson.119 The Sixth Circuit took a similar position in Taylor, 																																																								
111 Id.  
112 United States v. Vivas–Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). 
113 Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e agree with the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not meaningfully distinguishable from 
the ACCA's residual clause and that, as a result, § 16(b), and by extension 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(F), must be deemed unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson.”). 
114 Cf. § 924(c)(3) and § 16(b). 
115 Dimaya 803 F.3d at 1120 (“Although the government can point to a couple of minor 
distinctions between the text of the [ACCA] residual clause and that of the INA’s definition of 
a crime of violence, none undermines the applicability of Johnson 's fundamental holding to 
this case.”). 
116 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016). 
117 Id. at 149 (noting that “four other circuits… have considered the language in 18 U.S.C. § 
16(b), which appears materially the same as that in § 924(c)(3)(B), and have determined that § 
16(b) is void for vagueness after Johnson,” but noting that “we find these opinions 
unpersuasive”). 
118 Id. at 150 (“we do not find these § 16(b) cases persuasive, and we decline to follow their 
reasoning here”). 
119  Id. (“Having considered each of Hill’s arguments that the risk-of-force clause is 
unconstitutionally vague, we are unpersuaded.”).  
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and found substantial textual differences between § 924(c) and the ACCA 
residual clause at issue in Johnson.120 
 
Accordingly, there is a split of authority as to whether the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of the ACCA residual clause in Johnson also requires invalidating 
the residual clause of § 924(c), at issue in Angelos. On the one hand, the Sixth 
and Second Circuits found sufficient textual differences between the ACCA 
and § 924(c) residual clauses to prevent Johnson from requiring the 
invalidation of § 924(c).121 On the other hand, the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits found Johnson to require at least invalidating the INA residual clause, 
which is practically indistinguishable from the § 924(c) residual clause.122 
 
Thus, consider Judge Cassell’s situation if he were faced with applying a 
sentencing enhancement under § 924(c) today. Judge Cassell was sitting in the 
District of Utah, which is within the Tenth Circuit. Plausibly, he would be 
bound to invalidate the § 924(c) residual clause under Golicov, which 
invalidated the INA residual clause under Johnson (just like the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Dimaya).123 
 
To make matters more theoretically interesting, however, suppose Judge 
Cassell were sitting within a Circuit that had yet to weigh in on whether 
Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause carries over to the INA or 
§ 924(c) residual clauses. Suppose Judge Cassell’s court were within the D.C. 
Circuit, for instance. What situation would he then face? A very close call. On 
the one hand, he could rely on the Second and Sixth Circuits’ reasoning as 
persuasive authority for declining to strike down § 924(c) as unconstitutionally 
vague under Johnson. On the other hand, he could follow the reasoning of the 
Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which invalidated the essentially 
indistinguishable INA residual clause on the basis of Johnson, and therefore 
decide to strike down § 924(c) under Johnson as well. Reasonable minds, it 
would appear, can differ. 
 
Given that there is a Circuit split on this issue, we think that if Judge 
Cassell were deciding the case today while sitting within a Circuit that had yet 
to decide the matter, it would be legally acceptable to strike down § 924(c) on 
the basis of Johnson relying on the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s 
decisions as persuasive authority. This would be a Satisficing Option of the 
sort that we think judges should adopt where possible. Given the Seventh, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s reasoning, a hypothetical Judge Cassell would have 
a plausible legal basis for invalidating § 924(c) under Johnson, and so it would 
lead to what we take to be the distinctively morally better outcome. What’s 																																																								
120 See supra note 103. 
121  See supra notes 103 (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Taylor), 116-118  
(discussing the Second Circuit’s decision in Hill). 
122  See supra notes 108 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dimaya), 112-113 
(discussing similar cases from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits).  
123 Golicov, 837 F.3d at 1072.  
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more, this decision is at least defensible by the lights of the law. The Seventh, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits did not think there were sufficient textual differences 
to treat the INA residual clause, which is identical to § 924(c), any differently 
from the ACCA residual clause—i.e. as unconstitutionally vague.  
Accordingly, we think someone in Judge Cassell’s position today should 
resolve the close call on the legal question by appealing to the decisive moral 
reasons against applying the § 924(c) residual clause to a defendant like Mr. 
Angelos whose minor offenses do not warrant such harsh sentences. We can 
numerically represent this scenario as follows:   
 
Faced with a scenario like this, we think it would be sound for Judge Cassell to 
break the tie on the legal question by appealing to (what we assume to be) the 
decisive moral reasons in favor of invalidating the § 924(c) residual clause and 
thus preventing the harsh mandatory minimum sentences it triggers from being 
widely applied. 
 
So far, we have only argued that moral reasons can break a strict numerical 
tie on a legal question. But we would also go slightly further than that. We 
think overwhelming moral reasons can not only break a strict tie, but also be 
the basis for resolving a very close legal question, which is not quite a tie.  
 
Thus, for the sake of argument, suppose that the Second and Sixth Circuits 
have a slightly better legal position when compared to the Seventh, Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits’ position. That is, suppose arguendo that the textual differences 
that the Second and Sixth Circuits picked up on between the ACCA and § 
924(c) residual clauses are robust enough that strictly speaking the best legal 
resolution of the case would be to refrain from invalidating the § 924(c) 
residual clause under Johnson. Still, the question remains a close call. There 
are also weighty legal reasons in favor of invalidation, given the close textual 
parallels between the ACCA and § 924(c) residual clauses. These are what led 
the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits to strike down the INA residual clause 
(given that the INA and § 924(c) residual clauses are the same). Plausibly, the 
remaining differences that exist between the ACCA and the § 924(c) residual 
clauses—e.g. that the former says “potential risk” while the latter says 
“substantial risk”—are not robust enough to save the § 924(c) residual clause 
from the degree of vagueness that felled the ACCA residual clause. Some 
might think the § 924(c) residual clause remains vague to an unconstitutional 
degree. But even supposing that this interpretation is slightly less well 
supported by the applicable legal reasons, it is still a close enough a call to be 
at least legally defensible to strike down the § 924(c) residual clause under 
Johnson. Thus, consider the case might not be a strict tie on the legal question, 
but rather can be represented in the following way: 
 
 6TH & 2D CIR. (DON’T EXTEND 
JOHNSON TO § 924(c)) 
7TH, 9TH & 10TH CIR. (EXTEND 
JOHNSON TO § 924(c)) 
MORAL REASONS 2 7 
LEGAL REASONS 7 7 
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We contend that because there is strong legal support for either option here—
even if the Sixth Circuit position is slightly better, legally speaking—extending 
Johnson to § 924(c) is a Satisficing Option that Judge Cassell should take. 
Given the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions, a Judge Cassell 
(deciding Angelos today in the D.C. Circuit) would be justified in striking 
down the § 924(c) residual clause following the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits. There is weighty legal backing for this decision and it is decisively 
favored by the moral reasons. In this way, we think appeal to decisive moral 
reasons not only can serve as a way to break a strict numerical tie on a legal 
issue, we also think they can be the basis for resolving a very close legal 
question, which isn’t strictly a tie—as represented in the table above. Where it 
is not a close call, legally speaking, however, the judge would not be dealing 
with a genuinely Satisficing Option, and so we think it would not be properly 
available.124 
 
One final note: the posture assumed in the above discussion will not last 
long. The Supreme Court is about to rule on whether to endorse the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Dimaya, which extended Johnson to invalidate the INA 
residual clause.125 Our analysis sought to draw an interesting lesson from 
considering the position of the hypothetical Judge Cassell who has to re-decide 
Angelos today while not being decisively bound by a precedential decision of a 
superior court. But if the Supreme Court rejects the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits’ reasoning, then this would no longer be a legally available 
interpretation. Hence it would not be a Satisficing Option, on our view. To be a 
Satisficing Option that would genuinely resolve the judge’s dilemma, a legal 
interpretation cannot expressly be ruled out by a precedential decision of a 
higher court.126  																																																								
124 Note one limitation of our argument. We do not contend that Judges who resolve a close 
call on a legal question on the basis of decisive moral reasons should always come out and say 
that this is what they are doing. We are agnostic on that difficult prudential and strategic 
question. Perhaps coming out and saying that they are resolving a legally close call on clear 
moral grounds would be favored for transparency reasons. On the other hand, this might also 
be disfavored for reasons of preserving trust in the neutrality of the judicial system—to say 
nothing of being disfavored by career advancement reasons in a judicial system like the United 
States.  
125 See Kevin Johnson, Argument analysis: Is the statutory phrase “crime of violence” in the 
immigration laws void for vagueness? (Jan. 18, 2017) (available online: 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-statutory-phrase-crime-violence-
immigration-laws-void-vagueness/) (analyzing the oral arguments in Dimaya and concluding 
that “[e]ven if the justices are willing to apply due process scrutiny to Section 16(b), however, 
they appear to be divided as to whether this case is distinguishable from Johnson v. United 
States and whether Section 16(b) is void for vagueness”). 
126 Note that this also raises potential moral risks for judges pursuing such an interpretative 
strategy: the judge must consider how their decision changes the conditional probability that a 
 6TH & 2D CIR. (DON’T EXTEND 
JOHNSON TO § 924(c)) 
7TH, 9TH & 10TH CIR. (EXTEND 
JOHNSON TO § 924(c)) 
MORAL REASONS 2 7 
LEGAL REASONS 7.1 7 
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B. Expressive Strategies 
 
We have contrasted two constitutional challenges to mandatory minimums 
in order to illustrate how judges can adopt morally preferable and legally 
permissible albeit sub-optimal interpretations of the law. That’s the first type 
of strategy we think judges can take, on their own, to resolve judicial 
dilemmas. The second type of strategy we will consider is expressive, in the 
sense that it consists of the judiciary expressing its moral condemnation of the 
laws that it applies. Like the first, this is also a strategy that judges can adopt 
on their own. Though unlike interpretative strategies, the expression of judicial 
condemnation is not confined to the courtroom: judges can express 
condemnation in a range of venues. We think that it is worth separating two 
outlets for the expression of moral condemnation by the judiciary.  
 
The first outlet is in judicial decisions, as dicta. Judge Paul Cassell, for 
instance, originally decried that Weldon Angelos’ sentence was “cruel, unjust 
and irrational” in the sentencing decision itself.127 A number of other judges 
have similarly expressed condemnation of mandatory minimum sentencing 
provisions,128 especially in the Eastern District of New York—in judicial 
decisions.129 It’s conceivable that judges could take this expressive strategy 
further. For instance, judges could attach a stock paragraph to every legal 
opinion that they issue—regardless of whether it is a civil or a criminal case—
that decries the injustice of certain types of mandatory minimum sentences. 
 
The second outlet is in extra-judicial writing: Cassell condemned the 
mandatory minimum sentencing provision in application to Angelos in a 
number of academic articles,130 speeches, and opinion pieces in popular media 
outlets. 131  Other prominent judges have similarly condemned mandatory 																																																																																																																																																		
higher court would issue a precedential decision on the interpretative issue at hand and thereby 
close off opportunities for other lower courts to resolve such judicial dilemmas. Say that a 
judge on a lower court knows both (a) that she is subject to unusually close scrutiny (and hence 
is more likely to have her decisions appealed to higher courts), and (b) that the current higher 
courts are more likely to issue a verdict that closes off options for resolving judicial dilemmas. 
Plausibly, there would be good moral reasons for such a judge to eschew this interpretative 
strategy (and pursue the other strategies outlined below), in order to increase the odds that it is 
left available to others. 
127 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. 
128 For a recent example, see United States v. Wendell Rivera-Ruperto, No. 13-2017 (Jan 13, 
2017, 1st Cir.). 
129 In particular, Judges Weinstein, Gleeson, Dearie and Block are notable examples.  
130 Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (And a 
Critique of the Federal Mandatory Minimums), Stanford Law Review 2004 56; Paul Cassell 
and Erik Luna Mandatory Minimalism Cardozo Law Review 32(1) 2010; Paul G. Cassell and 
Erik Luna Sense and Sensibility in Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Federal Sentencing 
Reporter 2011 
131 See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Former federal judge to President Obama: Free the man I 
sentenced to 55 years in prison, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2016) 
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/09/former-federal-judge-to-
president-obama-free-the-man-i-sentenced-to-55-years-in-prison/); Families Against 
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minimums in these fora.132 
 
It is important to distinguish these outlets for expressive strategies in part 
because it is plausible that some legal reasons militate against expressing 
condemnation in dicta in particular. For the judiciary to condemn legislation 
on purely moral grounds in judicial opinions could compromise the appearance 
of impartiality at the crucial point at which judges exercise their duties of 
office; we think it is plausible that no similar legal reasons militate against the 
judiciary expressing outrage in extra-judicial writing, or, if they do, those 
reasons have less force in such contexts.133 Given this, there is at least some 
basis for considering expressive strategies to not meet a legal ideal, in 
comparison to pure obedience. But we do not think that it is plausible that 
judges are legally required to not decry that the laws they must apply are 
unjust, cruel and irrational. In other words, expressive strategies are not legally 
ideal (especially if they may run up against the limits of the canons of 
professional ethics), but they frequently can be legally permitted.  
 
It is also important to distinguish these outlets for expressive strategies 
because somewhat different moral reasons militate in their favor. Extra-judicial 
writing plays an important role with respect to informing the public: within a 
deliberative democracy, it draws attentions to politically relevant injustices in 
the legal system that might not otherwise be salient to the voting populace. The 
moral significance of this should not be understated. There is some evidence 
that public support for mandatory minimums is undergirded by a familiar bias: 
the “availability heuristic”. Mandatory minimums are popular when considered 
in the abstract, because when the public accept the generic proposition that 
drug dealers who use firearms should be subject to minimum sentences of x 
years, they are likely to assess its merits in terms of the most cognitively 
accessible instance of that group: a real or imagined individual who is far more 																																																																																																																																																		
Mandatory Minimums, Report on Weldon Angelos (http://famm.org/weldon-angelos/); The 
Sentenced Project, Profile on Weldon Angelos (http://thesentencedproject.com/).  
132 Alan Feuer, Federal Judge Urges U.S. to ‘Jettison the Madness of Mass Incarceration’, N. 
Y. Times (June 23, 2016) (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/nyregion/federal-judge-urges-
us-to-jettison-the-madness-of-mass-incarceration.html?smid=re-share&_r=0).  
133 This is not to say that judges who express strong disapproval of existing legislation will not 
take any flack for it. Quite the contrary, we are aware that this can have professional and 
political consequences, as well as impacting the management of judges’ caseloads. For 
example, District Judge Shira Scheindlin was rebuked by the Second Circuit and removed 
from a case in part for extra-judicial criticism of New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk policies. See 
Pete Brush, 2nd Circ. Stop-And-Frisk Rebuke A Warning To Chatty Judges , Law360 (Nov. 1, 
2013) (https://www.law360.com/articles/485420/2nd-circ-stop-and-frisk-rebuke-a-warning-to-
chatty-judges) (“The panel stayed [Judge Scheindlin’s] rulings pending appeal and said 
Scheindlin ‘ran afoul’ — both in a courtroom statement and in comments to the news media — 
of the requirement that judges ‘avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety’ in their 
activities.”). Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2013) (vacated on other 
grounds) (observing that “[b]y order dated October 31, 2013, we both granted that stay and, 
because the appearance of impartiality had been compromised by certain statements made by 
Judge Scheindlin during proceedings in the district court and in media interviews, we 
reassigned the cases to a different district judge, to be chosen randomly”). 
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likely to resemble El Chapo than Weldon Angelos.134 When members of the 
public are asked to consider the application of mandatory minimums to 
particular cases like Angelos, support for these policies plummets. Since the 
expressive strategy can help make cases like Angelos more publically salient 
and accessible, it can thereby help ensure that the voting public assess 
mandatory minimums with a clearer sense of their impacts on offenders. To be 
clear, we are not claiming that an opinion piece in the Washington Post has this 
effect on its own. Rather, we think that extra-judicial writing can help bring 
more sustained media attention to mandatory minimums in general and cases 
like Angelos in particular. For instance, HBO’s Last Week Tonight with John 
Oliver may not have discussed Angelos if not for Cassell’s extra-judicial 
writings.135 That said, in a highly partisan political climate in which some 
already see the judiciary as a partisan political force, we recognize that for the 
judiciary to express disapproval or even outrage may have unintended short or 
long term negative consequences in the public perception of, or discourse 
about, the judiciary. We think that such risks must be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. It would be folly to assume that all extra-judicial expressions of 
condemnation—or none of them, for that matter—would be morally 
permissible.  
 
Since judicial opinions in the lower courts are rarely read by the voting 
public, or discussed in popular media, we do not think that such democratic 
considerations have much force in relation to expressing condemnation in 
dicta. However, we think that a number of moral considerations have 
significant force here. For one, we think that it is morally important to the 
judiciary that they use dicta to morally condemn at least the most egregiously 
unjust laws that they are nonetheless legally required to apply. In part, we think 
this is plausible for considerations related to the moral integrity of the 
sentencing judge:136 in other contexts, such as voting, it is often recognized 
that there are some self-regarding moral reasons to maintain one’s moral 
integrity.137 Moreover, the judiciary has moral reasons to condemn mandatory 
minimums in dicta in order to influence other judges. In a law review article 
published shortly after the Angelos decision, it was noted that “Judge Cassell’s 
actions may augur a new wave of judicial decision-writing in which judges 
record their observations about evolving sentencing norms and in so doing 
expand the post-Booker sentencing discussion to include mandatory 																																																								
134  See Loretta J. Stalans, Citizens' crime stereotypes, biased recall, and punishment 
preferences in abstract cases: The educative role of interpersonal sources, 17 L. & HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR, 451-70 (1993).   
135 See John Oliver, Last Week Tonight, Report on Mandatory Minimums (July 26, 2015); 
Melissa Locker, Watch John Oliver Demand an End to Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
Laws, TIME (July 27, 2017) (http://time.com/3972717/watch-john-oliver-last-week-tonight-
mandatory-minimum-laws/).  
136 There is a large literature on expressive and symbolic duties, as well as duties of protest. 
Bernard R. Boxill, Self-Respect and Protest, 6 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 58-69 (1976); 
Thomas E. Hill, Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence, 9 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
83-102 (1979). 
137  See Loren Lomasky and Geoffrey Brennan, Is there a Duty to Vote?, 17 SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY 62-86 (2000) (discussing expressive norms). 
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minimums.”138 There is at least some evidence that Cassell’s actions have had 
this influence. For instance, the majority in Rivera-Ruperto noted that in that 
case “the dissent relies largely on the rationale of Judge Cassell in United 
States v. Angelos.”139  
 
There are further moral reasons in favor of expressive strategies as well. 
For instance, we think that it can be meaningful and morally important to 
particular defendants that judges condemn unjust punishments in dicta. A 
standard view about the nature and justification of punishment is that both are 
in part expressivist: punishment constitutively involves the expression of 
blame, and whether it is justified in part depends on whether the expression of 
blame is fitting or appropriate.140 In other words, the severity of Angelos’ 
punishment is unjust in part because of the inappropriate severity of the moral 
condemnation of his character and conduct that it expresses. For Cassell to 
decry the injustice of the punishment he imposes undermines the 
condemnation expressed by the punishment itself. And this is not merely 
symbolic: it puts the defendant in a position where he or she can helpfully 
point to an authoritative expression of the injustice of his or her punishment in, 
for instance, applying for parole, or applying for employment upon release.  
 
Given this, we think that there are important moral reasons that favor 
expressive strategies, and that such strategies carry comparatively small moral 
risks. This makes them a fairly safe option. But expressive strategies also have 
obvious limitations, especially with respect to the defendants who are wronged 
by the criminal justice system. Angelos’ severe punishment does more than 
express unwarranted condemnation: it imposes hardships and restricts liberties. 
Decrying the injustice of such outcomes provides little comfort to those who 
suffer them. And plausibly, the fact that judges were intimately involved in the 
imposition of such hardships in past cases, and would be again in future cases, 
generates strong retrospective and prospective moral reasons for the judiciary 
to make reparations (to past defendants) and minimize harm (to future 
defendants).141 Given this, our verdict is that expressive strategies may not 
always be morally sufficient: in especially egregious cases, they may be a 
crucial component in resolving judicial dilemmas, but on their own they do not 
satisfice the moral considerations that apply to judges in judicial dilemmas.  
 																																																								
138 Eva S. Nilsen, Indecent Standards: The Case of U.S. versus Weldon Angelos, 11 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 537, 541 (2006).  
139 United States v. Wendell Rivera-Ruperto, No. 13-2017, ftn. 21 (Jan 13, 2017, 1st Cir.). This 
arguably shows that mandatory minimums present what has been dubbed the “sticky norms 
problem,” namely that “the prevalence of a social norm [e.g. against overly harsh sentences] 
makes decision makers reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that norm.” Dan Kahan, 
Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 YALE L. J. 607, 607 
(2000). 
140 The locus classicus for this view is Joel Feinberg’s work. See JOEL FEINBERG, The 
Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING (1970). 
141 These fall under two of the five fundamental prima facie moral duties famously discussed 
by Ross. W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930). 
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C. Assistive Strategies  
 
The two last two strategies we discussed were ones that judges can put to 
good use themselves, without the aid of other actors. By contrast, the next 
three strategies aim to enlist the help of other actors in securing morally 
preferable, but still legally permissible, outcomes. Thus, the third class of 
strategies that we will consider is assistive, in the sense that these strategies 
consist of the judiciary assisting or advocating on behalf of defendants for 
specific remedies from other actors outside the legal system. Generally, the 
assistive strategy will be most appropriate at or after the conclusion of the 
criminal trial. (In sub-sections D and E, we will consider attempts to enlist the 
help of specifically judicial actors, where some of these steps might also be 
taken before the trial concludes.) 
 
The most obvious (but not, to be clear, the only142) example of an assistive 
strategy thus would be for the judge to attempt to secure reprieves and pardons 
from the executive. This strategy is naturally coupled with suggestive 
strategies: judges are in a unique position to not only condemn unjust 
punishment of the accused, but also call on the executive to redress this 
injustice.   
 
The Constitution grants the President the power “to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offences against the United States,”143 and the executive retains 
wide discretion in exercising this power. As such, one safe option for the 
judiciary to take is to call out the injustice of a particular mandatory minimum 
sentence and recommend that the executive issue a commutation.  
 
Judicial involvement in clemency is typically limited to “when a 
sentencing judge is asked to make a recommendation in a particular pardon 
case.”144 Some judges have taken a more active involvement in the clemency 
process by recommending commutation in dicta in their judicial opinions. 
Judge Paul Cassell, for instance, did so in Angelos.145 This is rare, but buy no 
means the only case of a judge explicitly recommending clemency in a judicial 
																																																								
142 For example, judges might also encourage defendants to pursue a college education while 
incarcerated or after completion of the sentence—perhaps even offering a letter of support or 
recommendation for deserving parties. Last year, a federal judge issued a “federal certificate of 
rehabilitation” to a woman he had sentenced over a decade earlier. See Doe v. United States, 
No. 15-MC-1174 (E.D.N.Y., March 7, 2016), slip op at 2. There has also been litigation as to 
whether district courts have the power to expunge not only arrest records, but convictions after 
completion. Doe v. United States, No. 15-1967-cr (2d Cir., August 11, 2016). Such tools might 
be tried more often. This list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative of the range of 
options that could be pursued.  
143 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
144 The 2009 Criminal Justice Transition Coalition, Smart on Crime: Recommendations for the 
Next Congress 117  (Nov. 5, 2008).  
145 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.  
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opinion.146 Judges can also recommend clemency in public or private extra-
judicial writings: Cassell continued to call for Angelos’ sentence to be 
commuted in public fora and in, for instance, privately petitioning President 
Obama to “swiftly” commute Angelos’ sentence in February 2016.  
Interestingly, the rarity of active judicial involvement in the clemency 
process is a relatively new phenomenon. In the early years of the Republic. 
“federal judges were, then as now, sometimes required by law to impose 
punishments they considered unjust”, and in such situations judges 
recommended a grant of clemency “more frequently than they do today, and 
with greater expectation of success”, than today.147 Such recommendations 
were frequently solicited after defendants petitioned the President for 
clemency, but judges were also known to take “the initiative in approaching 
the President.”148 
Plausibly, for the judiciary to actively advocate on behalf of defendants—
especially in dicta—could undermine their impartiality, and the appearance 
thereof. So there are some grounds to consider this practice legally sub-
optimal. But we do not think these grounds amount to a legal duty, and any 
claim to the contrary would have the revisionary implication that a rare 
practice today that was relatively common practice in the early years of the 
Republic was legally impermissible all along. We find that implication 
implausible. This suggests that this option satisfices judges’ legal reasons.  
We also think that there is a range of moral reasons for the judiciary to take 
an active role in the clemency process. Some concern judges’ moral reasons to 
rectify unjust punishments that they have imposed: plausibly, Cassell has 
strong moral reasons to be concerned with Angelos’ fate given the role that he 
played in imposing Angelos’ punishment. Following other recent scholars, we 
also think that there are two more general moral reasons for judges to play an 
active and public role in the clemency process, whether they do so formally,149 
or informally.150 The first of these is the “alarming decline in the number of 
pardons and commutations granted by presidents,” which suggest “a need to 
look to the courts to help ‘reinvigorate’ the power.” 151  Prominently 
recommending clemency in judicial opinions, and persistently repeating such 
recommendations in extra-judicial writing, could help reverse this decline.  
 																																																								
146 See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378–79 (8th Cir. 1991) (Sachs, C.J.), 
United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009) (Friedman, J.) (“urge[ing] the 
President to consider executive clemency for McDade and to reduce McDade’s sentence”).  
147 George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential 
Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 FED SENT’G REP. 212, 212 (2004) 
148 Id, 213. 
149 See Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 U. ST. 
THOMAS L. J. 698 2012.  
150  See Joanna Huang, Correcting Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendations of 
Executive Clemency, 60 DUKE L. J. 131 (2010). 
151 See Kobil, supra note 149 at 698. 
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The second reason is the appearance, if not reality, that “clemency 
decisions can potentially violate Equal Protection or Due Process 
principles”.152 Margaret Love, a former U.S. Pardon Attorney, recently wrote 
that  
 
as the official route to clemency has all but closed, the back-door route has 
opened wide. In the past two administrations, petitioners with personal or 
political connections in the White House bypassed the pardon bureaucracy 
in the Department of Justice, disregarded its regulations, and obtained 
clemency by means (and sometimes on grounds) not available to the less 
privileged.153  
 
Similar accusations have been leveled at the use of executive clemency power 
by the states, especially by former Oklahoma Governor J.C. Walton, and 
former Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste.154  
 
Since the judiciary is	independent of the executive and best positioned to 
assess offenders’ culpability, granting clemency following sentencing judges’ 
recommendations in judicial opinions could improve the appearance, if not 
reality, of consistent and merit-based commutations. For these reasons, calls 
for clemency by the judiciary should be welcomed on moral grounds.  
 
That said, our ultimate assessment of assistive strategies is similar to our 
assessment of expressive ones: even though assistive strategies do have some 
chance of redressing the hardship that the particular defendant suffers, those 
chances are far too low for this strategy to be morally sufficient on its own. 
The alarming decline in the number of Presidential pardons and commutations 
makes it very unlikely that efforts to secure pardons for offenders like Angelos 
will be successful. That was true under President Obama, and it is all the more 
obviously true today: both President Trump and Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions have publicly championed the War on Drugs and tougher sentences 
for drug traffickers, so we can expect offenders like Angelos to be even less 
likely to receive pardons under the current administration.  
 
Indeed, even in the unlikely event that a judge advocates for a Presidential 
pardon and one is granted, we think the judge still may not have done enough 
to satisfy the moral obligations she owes to similarly situated defendants. This 
is because it is largely a matter of moral luck that such an endeavor was 
successful.155 Plausibly, when one judge successfully for an offender to receive 
a pardon and another judge is unsuccessful at that same endeavor, this less 
likely to reflect the merits of their respective cases for a reprieve, or their 																																																								
152 Id. 
153 Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1169,  1169 (2010). 
154 See Huang, supra note 150 at 150. 
155 See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24-38 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL 
LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, 20-39 (1981).  
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efforts and skills in publicly or privately petitioning for executive action. It is 
more likely to reflect factors beyond their control, such as the political climate 
at the time, or their (perceived) partisan alignment. If this is right, then if we 
think that the unsuccessful advocate did not do enough (morally speaking), we 
should hold the same verdict with regard to the successful advocate: unless 
there is some morally relevant difference in their conduct, neither did enough 
for wronged defendants; one was just lucky.  
 
Even if one disagrees with us about this last point, we think that there is a 
further reason why even successfully petitioning for a Presidential pardon is 
not by itself sufficient to satisfy all the judge’s moral reasons. Pardons 
typically target a select group of offenders. Securing a pardon for an individual 
like Angelos is likely to do little to help the many other similarly situated 
offenders; it is, moreover, very unlikely to help the enormous number of 
individuals who accept unfavorable plea bargains in order to avoid being 
subject to mandatory minimums. Offender-specific advocacy, then, does too 
little to address the systematic injustices imposed by mandatory minimums, for 
which the judiciary bear some moral responsibility. Plausibly, the moral 
reasons that apply to judges also support taking actions to rectify these 
systemic injustices that mandatory minimums predictably lead to. We will 
consider some such steps judges might take in this direction in the next section. 
 
We should emphasize, however, that in taking expressive and assistive 
strategies on their own to fail to satisfice the demands of morality, we are not 
ruling out that these strategies can form an integral part of a Satisficing Option. 
It may be, for instance, that it is morally permissible (though still not optimal) 
for a judge to combine interpretative, assistive, and expressive strategies. Here 
the legal costs may aggregate: a judge who pursued this approach may 
compromise the appearance of judicial impartiality to a degree that, while 
legally permissible, is far from optimal. But the moral gains would also 
aggregate: that judge would also do far more to help specific defendants 
(through increasing their odds of receiving an offender-specific remedy) while 
also helping similarly situated defendants (through increasing democratic 
opposition to mandatory minimums and/or rendering void their vague 
provisions). It also may be that in specific contexts no two of these strategies 
would be morally sufficient; the third would be necessary, even if not 
sufficient, for the judges’ conduct to satisfice the demands of morality. This 
illustrates how the assessment of specific strategies in isolation does not settle 
whether they can form part of a genuine Satisficing Option. And in doing so, it 
also illustrates the importance of the diachronic assessment of judges’ choices 
in judicial dilemmas: if we only considered in isolation a choice made in 
interpreting the law at trial, and in expressing condemnation at sentencing, and 
in advocating for a pardon post-sentencing, we may miss how this sequence of 
choices constitutes a Satisficing Option, even though no specific choice did.  
 
D. Cooperative Strategies  
 
This section focuses on a type of strategy that is similar in spirit to the 
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assistive strategies just discussed, but while the latter help harmed parties to 
obtain relief from other branches of government, the strategies discussed in 
this section involve pushing for cooperation from legal actors within the courts 
system. These cooperative strategies can be pursued in tandem with others on 
our list. The aim is to enlist the help of prosecutors or other legal actors to open 
up legally available avenues for securing morally preferable solutions to a 
particular case, or class of cases, which otherwise would not be easily 
available.  
 
Cooperative strategies come in many varieties. Sometimes a judge might 
use carrots to incentivize legal actors to voluntarily collaborate to find morally 
preferable solutions that remain legally available. Other times, the judge might 
resort to sticks of various kinds to compel such cooperation. Moreover, some 
cooperative strategies are ex post responses to a judicial dilemma that has 
already arisen in a particular case. As we’ll see, several courts have recently 
used such a strategy effectively to re-open cases where the other apparent 
options for avoiding injustice have been exhausted. By contrast, other 
cooperative strategies—like alternative sentencing programs—are ex ante 
efforts to prevent judicial dilemmas from arising in the first place by setting up 
institutional mechanisms to systematically side-step mandatory minimums 
where such sentences would be least appropriate. We begin with the ex post, 
case-specific cooperative strategies before turning to the ex ante version 
toward the end of this section. 
 
1. Seeking Cooperation from Prosecutors 
 
One of the most natural ways that judges might seek to resolve judicial 
dilemmas is to push for cooperation from prosecutors to avoid charges that 
trigger unjust mandatory minimum sentences. Such cooperation can take place 
while the trial is pending or in progress to prevent a judicial dilemma from 
arising. It can also take place ex post—that is, after a judicial dilemma has 
arisen—when judges work with prosecutors to seek a legally available 
mechanism for imposing a fairer sentence. Either way, this strategy is case-
specific: it focuses on redressing or ameliorating the unjust punishment of a 
particular defendant. This strategy itself comes in several flavors. As we’ll see, 
some judges might not rest easy with merely requesting prosecutorial 
cooperation, but in fact take active steps to compel it. 
 
In a growing trend, several courts have begun employing this sort of 
strategy. 156  Particularly in cases involving defendants sentenced under 
especially harsh mandatory minimum provisions, some courts were able to get 
prosecutors to agree to allow the defendant’s conviction to be vacated, thus 
allowing the defendant to be resentenced more moderately after pleading guilty 
to lesser charges that did not carry a mandatory minimum. Despite being used 																																																								
156 See Richard A. Serrano, Cocaine smuggler serving 140 years freed early, part of national 
trend, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015) (http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-prisoner-release-
20150916-story.html). 
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in a variety of cases,157 this is often referred to as the Holloway doctrine, after 
the 2014 case of United States v. Holloway.158  
 
The background for Holloway is this. In the mid-1990s, District Judge John 
Gleeson was required to sentence Francois Holloway to 57 years, on the basis 
of two “stacked” gun charges under § 924(c), each carrying a mandatory 
minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment.159  Once the appeal and the standard 
post-conviction litigation concluded, 160  Judge Gleeson issued an order in 
February 2013 asking Attorney General Loretta Lynch to consider agreeing to 
vacate Holloway’s convictions so that he could be resentenced. 161  
“Recognizing that there were good reasons to revisit Holloway’s excessive 
sentence but no legal avenues or bases for vacating it,” Judge Gleeson 
requested “the United States Attorney [to] consider exercising her discretion to 
agree to an order vacating two or more of Holloway’s [firearms convictions 
under] 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)…”162 The procedural mechanism at work here was 
the Rule 60(b) motion Holloway had filed in 2012 to re-open his earlier habeas 
petition,163 arguing that his sentence was unjust but that he had no other legal 
avenues available to him by which to seek justice.164 Holloway had served 20 
years by then and had been an exemplary prisoner, and the Judge felt 
Holloway deserved better treatment.165 But in July 2013, Attorney General 
Lynch initially denied Judge Gleeson’s request, arguing that Holloway’s 
proper avenue of relief was to request clemency from the President.166  
 
However, Judge Gleeson then issued a second order on May 14, 2014 
requesting that the Attorney General reconsider her decision.167 The reason 																																																								
157 See United States v. Rivera, No. 83-00096-01-CR (E.D. Oak.); Drug Lifer Luis Rivera 
Released Tuesday Under New “Holloway” Doctrine (http://clemencyreport.org/lifer-luis-
rivera-released-tuesday-under-holloway-doctrine/); Clair Johnson, Judge cuts 159-year 
sentence in casino robbery case, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Oct. 27, 2010) 
(http://billingsgazette.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/judge-cuts--year-sentence-in-casino-
robbery-case/article_9c4c5966-e1e4-11df-b934-001cc4c03286.html) (discussing Judge 
Richard Cebull’s efforts to get the prosecutor to agree to the court’s granting defendant Marion 
Hungerford’s habeas petition, so that the court could vacate her sentence of 159 years and 
resentence her to seven years for lesser offenses). See also United States v. Holloway, 68 
F.Supp.3d 310, ftn. 2 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (describing other cases from the same District in which 
a similar procedural mechanism had been employed).  
158 United States v. Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 
159 Id. at 312-13. 
160 Id. at 313-14 (describing Holloway’s direct appeal and habeas petitions). 
161 Id. at 314.  
162 Id.  
163 Id.  
164 Id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 60(b) states that “[o]n motion and just terms, the 
court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding” not only on the basis of conditions like “mistakes” or “newly discovered 
evidence,” but also for “any other reason that justifies relief.” F.R.Crim.P. 60(b)(1)-(6).  
165 Holloway. 68 F.Supp.3d at 314.  
166 Id.  
167 Id. at 314-15. See also United States v. Holloway, Order, No. 01-CV-1017, Dkt. # 54 
(E.D.N.Y.) (order requesting the Attorney General to reconsider) 
(http://www.schlamstone.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/holloway.pdf).  
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was that the President had in the meantime issued new guidelines for clemency 
decisions, which said that non-violent offenders were to be prioritized.168 Since 
Holloway had committed robbery, he would not have qualified for clemency 
under the new rules.169 Judge Gleeson’s strongly worded order requested that 
the prosecutors reconsider their decision to continue opposing the vacatur of 
Holloway’s conviction. In fact, the order concluded by supplementing the 
high-minded appeal to conscience with several concrete threats: the Judge 
stated that unless the prosecutors cooperated, he would reopen several 
constitutional issues in the case, which would require a great deal of briefing 
from the prosecutor’s office.170  
 
The prosecutors agreed to the court’s second request and stated that they 
were willing to drop their opposition to the motion to reopen Holloway’s 
habeas petition.171 That gave the court the authority to vacate Holloway’s 
conviction, and going forward the prosecution agreed to drop the “stacked” 
gun counts with the mandatory minimums.172 Thus, Holloway’s sentence could 
be dramatically reduced. He was subsequently resentenced to time served.173 
 
Once the defendant has pursued all legally available avenues of relief, this 
sort of advocacy by the court seems uniquely appropriate. It is a meaningful 
step the judge can take to help right the moral wrong he or she was forced to 
impose. Moreover, even if the judge ultimately fails to get prosecutors to agree 
to vacate the defendant’s sentence, as happened in Holloway, the defendant 
will at least see the court acting forcefully on his behalf, which likely would be 
felt to count for something.  
 
Thus, requesting cooperation from prosecutors can be an effective way to 
resolve a judicial dilemma—provided the requested cooperation is given. This, 
however, highlights a drawback of cooperative strategies in general: There is 
always a risk that the requested cooperation will not be forthcoming. That risk 																																																								
168 Id. at 4 (noting that “[r]ecent events make it clear that clemency is not a realistic avenue to 
justice for Holloway”); see also Holloway. 68 F.Supp.3d at 314. 
169 See Holloway Order, supra note 167, at 4 (observing that “the fact that Holloway committed 
crimes of violence will disqualify him” under the new clemency rules); Holloway. 68 
F.Supp.3d at 312, 314. 
170 See Holloway Order, supra note 167, at 6. The court explained: In the absence of a 
government agreement to reopen the sentencing, I will address the pending application to 
reopen Holloway’s collateral challenge to his conviction. The extraordinary trial penalty in this 
case may warrant further briefing on the constitutional issues raised by such a use of 
prosecutorial power. In addition, though I long ago rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on trial counsel’s admission in his opening statement that Holloway in fact 
robbed the three victims of their cars, upon further reflection I may direct a closer inspection of 
that issue as well.” Id.  
171 Holloway. 68 F.Supp.3d at 315. 
172 Id. at 315-16.  
173 Monique O. Madan, At Behest of Judge, U.S. Shortens Man’s 57-Year Mandatory Sentence, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014) (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/nyregion/at-judges-behest-
us-shortens-mans-57-year-mandatory-sentence.html) (noting that Holloway, “who had been 
serving a 57-year mandatory federal prison sentence was resentenced on Tuesday to time 
served”). 
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would be especially pronounced in jurisdictions where prosecutors have been 
given institutional incentives to seek as many convictions as possible, with the 
most severe sentences available.  
 
2. Compelled Cooperation  
 
If cooperation is requested and refused, judges might nonetheless use other 
tools at their disposal to elicit it. To give this approach a name, we might call it 
the strategy of compelled cooperation. The idea is	 to create competing 
institutional incentives for the relevant legal actors to collaborate in finding 
morally preferable outcomes. In the case of prosecutors, it is worth bearing in 
mind that they are repeat players in the courtroom, and so judges have 
numerous tools at their disposal to pressure prosecutors to help find ways to 
avoid the most extreme injustices caused by mandatory minimums. 
 
Holloway itself demonstrates what the compelled cooperative strategy 
might look like. Judge Gleeson showed himself willing to insist quite 
forcefully on prosecutorial cooperation toward seeking a more morally 
defensible sentence for Mr. Holloway, who otherwise faced a prison term the 
judge himself dubbed “excessive.” 174  Recall the court’s threat to create 
substantially more work for the prosecutor’s office by reopening several 
constitutional issues in the case unless the prosecutors agreed to cooperate in 
securing a more just outcome for Mr. Holloway.175 This amounts to imposing 
concrete consequences for prosecutors in the event that they unreasonably 
withhold cooperation; a prosecutor seeking to maximize convictions within 
considerable time constraints will naturally wish to avoid having to engage in 
complex, time-consuming constitutional analysis in order to secure a single 
conviction.  
 
In this way, the court did not merely request cooperation, but took active 
steps to extract it. There are a variety of concrete consequences that judges 
might take to elicit cooperation where it is not forthcoming. Mandatory 
minimums might erode judicial discretion over sentencing, but they do not 
erode judicial discretion over a wide range of procedural matters that affect 
individual prosecutors. To be clear, our claim here is not that judges should 
engage in any form of prejudicial treatment of prosecutors that violates the law 
or is otherwise legally unsupportable. That, of course, would not satisfice the 
law’s demands and so would not count as a Satisficing Option. However, a 
judicial action can be legally permissible even if it is not the absolutely top-																																																								
174 Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d at 314. 
175 See Holloway Order, supra note 167, at 6. The court explained: “In the absence of a 
government agreement to reopen the sentencing, I will address the pending application to 
reopen Holloway’s collateral challenge to his conviction. The extraordinary trial penalty in this 
case may warrant further briefing on the constitutional issues raised by such a use of 
prosecutorial power. In addition, though I long ago rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on trial counsel’s admission in his opening statement that Holloway in fact 
robbed the three victims of their cars, upon further reflection I may direct a closer inspection of 
that issue as well.” Id.  
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ranked option in terms of the applicable legal reasons. If judges use procedural 
rulings to elicit cooperation from prosecutors who might otherwise withhold it 
(perhaps unreasonably), this might be sub-optimal by the lights of the law, but 
still legally permissible. This allows for a kind of forceful advocacy in pursuit 
of outcomes that are both legally and morally satisfactory, which can be a 
promising way to resolve judicial dilemmas in this context. Schematically, the 
strategy is to create incentives for prosecutors to push them to cooperate in 
seeking legally available resolutions of particular cases that are morally 
preferable.  
 
One might object that this approach is too little too late for Mr. Holloway. 
It is merely a post hoc fix to a wrong that has already happened, which one 
might fairly argue is not nearly as good as avoiding the wrong in the first 
place.  
 
We think this is a legitimate concern in Mr. Holloway’s case. But in 
principle, there are ways to avoid it. One could imagine judges signaling to the 
parties set to appear before the court what the consequences will be for failing 
to cooperate as needed in pursuit of justice. For example, the judge might 
adopt a standing policy—perhaps in the form of a local rule—requiring 
prosecutors to cooperate to avoid triggering mandatory minimums in cases 
where it is most likely to result in excessive sentences, and not merely at the 
sentencing stage, but also with respect to initial charging decisions. Although 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions has recently ordered that the DOJ policy going 
forward will be to always charge defendants with the most serious offense that 
is available, 176  judges might seek to counteract this development by 
establishing standing policies that require cooperation from individual 
prosecutors in pursuit of more restrained charging decisions, as well as less 
severe positions with regard to sentencing. Indeed, a judge could in principle 
back up such a standing policy with the sort of threat made by Judge Gleeson 
in Holloway to the effect that failing to cooperate in pursuit of more moderate 
sentences would yield an onerous workload and could result in personal 
inconvenience for non-cooperative prosecutors in extreme cases. In a similar 
vein, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers suggests that 
defense attorneys move for the court to order prosecutors to comply with the 
applicable ethical rules in order to give these rules more bite in the event of 
serious non-compliance.177 																																																								
176 See supra note 43; see also Kevin Johnson, Attorney General Jeff Sessions enacts harsher 
charging, sentencing policy, USA TODAY (May 12, 2017) (reporting that “Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions is directing federal prosecutors to seek ‘the most serious’ criminal charges 
against suspects”) (https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/05/12/attorney-
general-jeff-sessions-enacts-harsher-charging-sentencing-policy/101571324/). 
177 Barry Scheck and Nancy Gertner, Combatting Brady Violations With An ‘Ethical Rule’ 
Order for the Disclosure of Favorable Evidence, The Champion (May 2013) 
(https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=28478) (“What the defense attorney should do to 
make the ‘ethical order’ motion is very straightforward: File a pretrial motion that tracks and 
cites the relevant ethical rule of the defense attorney’s jurisdiction…[and a]sk for an order that 
the prosecutor search her file and disclose all information that ‘tends to negate the guilt of the 
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The array of steps that fall within the strategy of compelled cooperation is 
limited only by the judge’s imagination—and the law. An even bolder idea that 
might appeal to some judges (if not all) would be to demand, as a condition for 
appearing before the court, that prosecutors sign a pledge in which they 
promise to cooperate in pursuit of justice where charging and sentencing is 
concerned. Violating the pledge could then form the basis for sanctions should 
reasonable cooperation be arbitrarily or unjustifiably refused. For example, had 
such a pledge been in effect in Holloway, the prosecutors refusing to cooperate 
to provide a legal avenue for imposing a more appropriate sentence on Mr. 
Holloway could perhaps have been deemed non-cooperative, which could 
trigger concrete consequences for violating the pledge.  
 
Of course, using such a heavy hand in extracting cooperation carries risks. 
Most importantly, it risks undermining the appearance of the court’s neutrality. 
Accordingly, quite some care would have to be taken by the court in crafting a 
standing policy of this sort in order to remain neutral between litigants and 
merely demand a cooperative approach by all involved in pursuit of just case 
outcomes. Perhaps the policy could be specifically limited to cases where 
mandatory minimums are implicated. To further minimize the threat to the 
appearance of judicial neutrality, perhaps the forceful mechanisms designed to 
promote cooperation from litigants in avoiding overly harsh sentences would 
be triggered only post-conviction, once the relevant facts have been legally 
established by a jury or by plea. If it then becomes clear that, for example, the 
prosecution behaved in a non-cooperative manner through overly aggressive 
charging decisions (e.g. involving a frivolous use of “stacking”), and then 
continued to refuse to cooperate in pursuit of moderation at the sentencing 
stage, then and only then, the suggestion goes, would the relevant sanctions in 
the standing policy be triggered. Crafting the court’s policy in such a way 
would help lessen the risks to the perception of judicial neutrality. What’s 
more, the judge’s efforts to elicit cooperation from litigants need not all take 
the form of threatened burdens; instead, they might involve efforts to name and 
laud parties who have been especially helpful and cooperative in pursuit of 
justice—as the prosecutors in Hungerford proved to be.178 
 
Given all this, we think that using the judge’s unique position to put 
pressure on litigants to work together to avoid excessive sentences—perhaps 
especially in cases like Holloway—can be a promising way for judges to 
navigate the conflict between their legal and moral reasons where mandatory 
minimums are concerned.179 The compelled cooperative strategy must be 																																																																																																																																																		
accused or mitigates the offense.’”). 
178 See supra note 13. 
179 It seems there are several kinds of moral reasons that apply in this context. First, it seems 
judges have moral reasons to make up for the wrong that she personally commits by applying 
overly harsh mandatory minimums without sufficient efforts to avoid or mitigate this result. 
Second, judges plausibly also have moral reasons to avoid unjust sentences owing to 
mandatory minimums in general, which the judiciary can at least be complicit in, even when 
the specific case in question does not involve sentencing anybody unfairly. The measures taken 
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executed with care, bearing in mind the crucial importance of minimizing the 
threat to the perception of the court’s neutrality and commitment to the rule of 
law. But used within appropriate limits, we suggest that it can be an effective 
tool for resolving judicial dilemmas. This is just another way to say that 
pursuing such strategies within proper limits can amount to the sort of 
Satisficing Option we expressed sympathy for above.  
 
3. Ex Ante Cooperative Strategies 
 
Thus far we have focused on case-specific strategies that aim—with 
varying degrees of forcefulness—to enlist the cooperation of litigants in 
pursuit of more just sentences. Besides the worries about judicial neutrality 
posed by more aggressive forms of compelled cooperation, a further concern 
about case-specific cooperative strategies is their ex post nature. As noted 
above, some might worry that seeking cooperation from prosecutors to re-open 
Mr. Holloway’s conviction was too little too late. So might there be ways for 
the judiciary to intervene earlier, in collaboration with prosecutors, to avoid 
imposing harsh sentences on particular low-level offenders, thus preventing 
judicial dilemmas from arising as frequently in this context? Moreover, is there 
a way for the judiciary to intervene more systematically to reduce the burdens 
that mandatory minimums bear on a broad class of defendants who are brought 
before courts? 
 
We think that there is. In addition to taking ex post steps to assist particular 
defendants who have already been haled before the court, judges have strong 
reasons to consider ex ante cooperative strategies that seek to divert defendants 
away from the criminal justice system in the first place. One obvious example 
of such a strategy that judges have pursued in some jurisdictions is to use, or 
work to establish, an alternative sentencing program.  
 
One success story in this vein is the Conviction and Sentencing Alternative 
(“CASA”) Program that has operated in the Central District of California since 
2012.180 It aims to provide those charged with felonies with an alternative to 
prosecution, conviction and incarceration. For a person charged with a crime to 
be selected for the program, broad judicial cooperation is required: The 
participating judge, the Pretrial Services Agency, the U.S. Attorney’s office 
and the Federal Public Defender’s office must all agree that the person selected 
is a suitable candidate.181 The participant enters a guilty plea under Rule 
11(c)(1)(C), which, upon successful completion of the program, binds the 
CASA judge to either dismiss the charges or enter a non-custodial sentence.182 																																																																																																																																																		
by Judge Gleeson in Holloway help satisfy the first set of moral reasons. The standing policy 
demanding cooperation from prosecutors in pursuit of just sentencing would be a way to 
comply with the second set of reasons.  
180  The Central District of California’s Conviction And Sentence Alternatives (“CASA”) 
Program at 1 (http://colsontaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/4.-Cardona-
Testimony.pdf).  
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 3. 
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Successful completion of the program requires that there are no disqualifying 
relapses.183 During the program, the participant is not incarcerated, but is 
supervised by the Pretrial Services Agency.184 
 
Two groups of defendants are eligible for the program. The first covers 
those with no criminal history to speak of, “whose criminal conduct appears to 
be an aberration that could appropriately be addressed by supervision” and 
rehabilitative programs.185 The second encompasses those with more serious 
criminal histories, “whose criminal conduct appears primarily motivated by 
substance abuse or similar issues,” and for these defendants, intensive 
treatment is typically part of the CASA program.186 The program generally 
excludes defendants charged with more serious offenses like child 
pornography, narcotics distribution, or violent crimes.187 
 
The heart of the CASA program is a course of monthly meetings between 
participants and CASA team members (the judge, prosecutor or other court 
officials) in a courtroom.188 These sessions are devoted to discussion between 
CASA participants and the CASA team members. The discussions are 
“intended to encourage self-recognition of the underlying causes, acceptance 
and understanding of the sanctions imposed.”189 Notably, the CASA program 
assumes that “there will be failures and relapses,” which are subject to 
increasing sanctions up to termination from the program.190 Accountability is 
not imposed top-down by the CASA team (e.g. a judge or a prosecutor); rather, 
CASA participants hold each other accountable.191 The Central District of 
California’s CASA program has graduated well over 100 participants by this 
point, 192 and its creators believe it is a success.193  
 
Making use of a program like CASA thus seem to be a very promising ex 
ante way for judges to respond to the judicial dilemmas they are likely to face 
where mandatory minimums are concerned. Indeed, several defendants who 
would have faced mandatory minimums of five to ten years successfully 																																																								
183 Id. at 4 (“repeated failures and relapses will result in graduated sanctions up to and 
potentially including termination from the program”).  
184 Id. at 1. 
185 Id. at 1. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 2.  
188 Id. at 3. 
189 Id. at 4 
190 Id.  
191 Id. (noting that the CASA discussion group thus is autonomous and egalitarian in the sense 
that other “program participants play an integral role in emphasizing the need for truthfulness, 
often providing examples of their own failures and relapses, their own efforts to lie about and 
fabricate excuses for these failures and relapses, and what has and has not worked for them in 
trying to come to grips with and address them”). 
192 Id. at 2. 
193 Id. (quoting one District Court judge who asserts that the program demonstrates that “even 
those who have committed crimes, can change for the better, and that given a little help they 
can break the vicious cycle of recidivism and failure that we see all too often in our criminal 
justice system”). 
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graduated from the Central District of California’s CASA program, and 
thereby avoided jail time.194 Using a program like CASA in cases where 
mandatory minimums would be especially unjust—which are precisely the 
cases where the defendant would be most likely to be a good fit for CASA—is 
a particularly attractive option because it avoids doing injustice to the 
defendant in the first place, which then requires an ex post response of the sort 
we discussed in earlier sections. After all, the program provides a legal 
mechanism by which the judge can, via cooperating with prosecutors, sidestep 
the need to impose a mandatory minimum sentence on the defendant at all. 
Moreover, judges could also take steps with varying degrees of strength to 
incentivize prosecutors to participate in such programs. As before, where the 
means to generate such incentives are legally permissible but sub-optimal, 
pursuing alternative sentencing programs can constitute a Satisficing Option.  
 
On the other hand, alternative sentencing programs may also face 
drawbacks as a way to avoid conflicts between a judge’s legal and moral 
reasons in the context of mandatory minimums. Some judges may not find 
themselves in a jurisdiction in which a program like CASA exists. These 
judges could still respond to their judicial dilemmas (past, present and future) 
by working to establish such a program. But that may be a difficult and time-
consuming task.195   Under such circumstances, judges might also use carrots 
or sticks (or both) to induce prosecutors and other legal actors to work together 
to set up an alternative sentencing program, which could turn this strategy into 
a full-fledged Satisficing Option in its own right.  
 
A different limitation of a CASA-style program is that only a narrow slice 
of defendants would be eligible. It is not hard to imagine that some of the 
excluded defendants still would be subject to mandatory minimums that are 
excessively harsh relative to what they deserve, given the mitigating factors 
that might apply in their particular cases. For example, Mr. Angelos was 
charged with drug trafficking offenses involving the use of a firearm, and so it 
is doubtful that he would be eligible for a program like CASA. 
 
Nonetheless, alternative sentencing programs have the advantage of 
providing a valuable ex ante method for reducing the incidence of judicial 
dilemmas in the first place. Working to establish such a program can figure 
into a series of steps that together constitute a broad, diachronic Satisficing 
Option (we might call it a satisficing package). Moreover, these programs have 
the benefit of not merely providing case-specific remedies, but rather promise 
to offer a more systemic response to the threat of judicial dilemmas in the 
sentencing context in general.196 They are thus worth including in the judge’s 																																																								
194 Id.  
195 Indeed, it is not hard to imagine pressure being put on U.S. Attorney’s offices not to 
participate in alternative sentencing programs like CASA to the extent this can be portrayed as 
“soft on crime.” 
196 Indeed, such programs could also help defendants who otherwise would be pressured into 
accepting unfavorable plea bargains due to the threatened use of mandatory minimums. See, 
e.g., Human Rights Watch, Report: An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors 
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arsenal of responses to judicial dilemmas. To put the point simply, even when 
judicial activity that uses or establishes an alternative sentencing program does 
not constitute a Satisficing Option (because it does not strictly resolve an 
existing judicial dilemma), it may be a necessary step towards avoiding future 
judicial dilemmas before they arise. Plausibly, merely responding to existing 
judicial dilemmas is not enough in the eyes of morality, given the importance 
of combating systemic injustices flowing from mandatory minimums. So the 
same reasons that make it worthwhile to consider how judges should resolve 
existing judicial dilemmas also warrant consideration of the legally permissible 
options for judges to prevent such dilemmas from arising in the first place.  
 
E. Suggestive Strategies 
 
The last two strategies we have just been discussing for dealing with 
judicial dilemmas have focused on how the judiciary can engage with other 
legal actors—especially the executive and prosecutors—to find legal avenues 
for avoiding or correcting the imposition of morally unjust sentences.  There is, 
however, one other group of actors in legal proceedings who have a significant 
degree of legal power to prevent unjust mandatory minimum punishments: 
juries. Juries have the legal power to nullify the law and prevent unjust 
punishments. This observation is the basis for the final strategy that we shall 
consider: rather than expressly cooperating with legal actors like prosecutors, 
judges can resolve judicial dilemmas by nudging other legal actors like juries 
to independently use their discretion in ways that would defuse judicial 
dilemmas. While we will focus on the role that judges can play in suggestively 
nudging the jury to nullify the law, this example is intended to illustrate more 
generally how the judiciary can use legally permissible if suboptimal means to 
nudge other legal actors to independently use their discretion in morally 
beneficial ways.  
 
Two initial points of clarification should be made about this strategy. First, 
what is jury nullification? If the jury is satisfied that the defendant’s guilt has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury have the power to acquit the 
defendant. When a jury does so because they believe that a conviction would 
be unjust (often because they believe that the resultant sentence would be too 
severe),197 they “nullify” the law in its application to that particular case. It is 
accepted that the jury has the power to nullify the law; we take no stand on the 
																																																																																																																																																		
Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, (Dec. 5, 2013), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-
force-drug-defendants-plead#page (noting that “[p]lea bargaining means higher sentences for 
defendants who go to trial,” and that “[t]he threat of higher sentences puts ‘enormous pressure 
[on defendants] to plead’). By diverting defendants away from the criminal justice system, 
alternative sentencing programs help defendants escape the pressure to plead that they would 
otherwise face because of harsher sentences should they elect to go to trial.  
197 Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullfcation Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1183 
(1997). 
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further, contested issue of whether the jury has a legal right to do so.198  
 
Second, what would it take for the judge to suggest that the jury nullify the 
law? There are several possibilities here, which differ in terms of the extent to 
which the relevant suggestion is (a) direct or indirect, and (b) explicit or 
implicit. On one end of the spectrum, the judge can instruct the duty to nullify 
the law by acquital because a conviction would result in injustice. On the other 
end of the spectrum, the judge can indicate that the defense will be allowed to 
introduce relevant evidence that ends up supporting a nullification argument. It 
is important to keep this spectrum in mind, as different ways of executing 
suggestive strategies raise different moral and legal considerations.  
 
Let’s start with directly and explicitly instructing the jury to nullify the law. 
In many jurisdictions explicit nullification instructions are legally 
impermissible.199 And even if they legally permissible, many contend that 
nullification instructions raise worrisome moral and legal concerns.200 Even 
scholars who argue that the jury has the right to nullify the law have shied 
away from advocating that the judiciary “explicitly recommend or actively 
encourage nullification”,201 due to the fear that nullification would become too 
widespread. It is not clear whether this fear is well grounded. Empirical 
evidence does not support the view that nullification instructions produce 
unwarranted acquittals. 202  But since direct and explicit nullification 																																																								
198 The United States Supreme Court held in its 1895 decision in Sparf & Hansen v. United 
States that the jury has the power but not the right to nullify the law. Sparf and Hansen v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). More recently, the D.C. Circuit noted that it may “invite 
chaos” to encourage the jury to nullify the law. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 
1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969)). 
Nonetheless, the court accepted that the jury can legitimately nullify the law in extraordinary 
cases. Id. at 1136 (noting that “[w]hat makes for health as an occasional medicine would be 
disastrous as a daily diet,” and recognizing the “existence of the jury’s prerogative”). See also 
Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 
17 (1997). Jury nullification has been estimated to occur in about 4% of cases. See Chaya 
Weinberg-Brodt, Jury Nullfication And Jury Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 826 
n.5 (1990). Nonetheless, it does not produce much case law, given that acquittals usually do 
not result in reported decisions. Major Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for 
Candor from the Bench and Bar, 173 MIL. L. REV. 68, 71 (2002). As a result, it is largely an 
academic debate “whether or not juries have a right to nullify, or whether it is just an illegal 
tradition that is tolerated.” Steve J. Shone, Lysander Spooner, Jury Nullification, and Magna 
Carta, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 651, 653 (2004). 
199 See Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 198 at 832 n.37; United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 
1006-07 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970); United States v Dellinger, 472 F.2d 
340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
200 See, e.g., Sparf and Hansen, 156 U.S. at 157 (Gray, J. dissenting) (“while the power of the 
jury is admitted, it is denied that they can rightfully or lawfully exercise it, (…). The law 
must…have intended, in granting this power to a jury, to grant them a lawful and rightful 
power(…).” (emphasis omitted)). 
201 Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of Law and Justice, 
2013 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1130 (2013). 
202 See Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, 
and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 439, 452 (1988); Keith 
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instructions are legally impermissible, this is a moot point.  
 
Further down the spectrum, judges can directly but implicitly suggest 
nullification in how they frame their instructions to the jury. Specifically, the 
idea would be to instruct juries that they “may find the defendant guilty only if 
her guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” This language 
communicates only a necessary condition for when jury is permitted to 
convict, and thereby implicates that the jury can acquit even when this 
condition is met, without explicitly stating that this is so. Certain courts have 
indicated that such instructions are legally permissible. 203  Some scholars 
defend such instructions on the legal basis that they are necessary to prevent a 
judicial deception: If it’s assumed that the jury has the right to nullify the law, 
it is “affirmatively misleading” to instruct the jury that “If you are satisfied that 
the defendant’s guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty”.204 Whether the “may convict” instruction is 
legally preferable to the “must convict” instruction, on the grounds that the 
latter is deceptive, depends on the contested issue of whether the jury does in 
fact have the legal right to nullify the law—an issue we do not aim to resolve 
here. However, even if direct but implicit suggestions were legally permitted, 
we do not think that this is the morally best way for judges to execute 
suggestive strategies. Psychological studies have found that the subtle 
implication in the instructions above has little effect on jury deliberations or 
verdicts;205 “in order to increase juror awareness of their power to nullify, 
instructions must contain a strong and explicit message.”206  
 
What about indirect ways of executing suggestive strategies? The 
suggestion can still be explicit or implicit. In some jurisdictions, the judge can 
allow defense attorneys to explicitly advocate for jury nullification in their 																																																																																																																																																		
E. Niedermeier, Irwin Horowitz, and Norbert L. Kerr, Informing Jurors of their Nullification 
Power: A Route to a Just Verdict or Judicial Chaos? 23 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 313 (1999). 
203 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The totality of input 
generally convey adequately enough the idea of prerogative, of freedom in an occasional case 
to depart from what the judge says. Even indicators that would on their face seem too weak to 
notice-like the fact that the judge tells the jury it must acquit (in case of reasonable doubt) but 
never tells the jury in so many words that it must convict-are a meaningful part of the jury's 
total input.” (emphasis added)). See also Judge B. Michael Dann, The Constitutional and 
Ethical Implications of “Must-Find-the- Defendant-Guilty” Jury Instructions, in JURY ETHICS: 
JUROR CONDUCT AND JURY DYNAMICS 104 (John Kleinig and James P. Levine eds., 2006) 
(questioning the validity of so-called “must-find-the-defendant-guilty” jury instructions, and 
supporting a “may-find-the-defendant-guilty” instruction instead). 
204 Dann, supra note 203 at 104. It is worth noting that others also object to the use of “must” 
in this context. See also Judge Jack B. Weinstein, The Many Dimensions of Jury Nullification, 
81 JUDICATURE  168-71 (1998).  
205 Irwin Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in 
Criminal Trials, 9 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 25 (1985). See also, Joseph A. Hamm, Brian 
H. Bornstein, Jenna Perkins, Jury nullification: The myth revisited in PSYCHOLOGY OF POLICY-
MAKING 49-71 (2013).  
206 Shari Seidman Diamond, When Ethics and Empirics are Entwined: A Response to Judge 
Dann’s Nullification Proposals, in JURY ETHICS: JUROR CONDUCT AND JURY DYNAMICS 109-
30, 122 (John Kleinig and James P. Levine eds., 2006). 
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closing arguments.207 Here the suggestion is explicit, but the judge plays an 
indirect role in allowing the suggestion to be made. The suggestion can also be 
indirect and implicit: judges can allow the defense to admit evidence that 
happens to support a nullification argument,208 including evidence of the 
severity of the mandatory minimum sentence that would attach to a conviction. 
This evidence is arguably relevant to the question of guilt.209 If the defendant 
knew that extremely harsh penalties would kick in for a particular crime, then 
the penalties themselves would be some evidence that the defendant didn't do 
the crime: this is the “anti-motive” theory. Interestingly, the empirical evidence 
suggests that juries are more likely to nullify when informed, implicitly or 
explicitly, of their nullification power by an attorney rather than a judge.210  
 
One legal challenge to this indirect and implicit version of suggestive 
strategies is that such evidence is irrelevant to the question of guilt, and hence 
legally inadmissible. In Shannon v. United States the Supreme Court held that 
“[i]nformation regarding the consequences of a verdict is . . . irrelevant to the 
jury’s task, so “when a jury has no sentencing function, it should be 
admonished to ‘reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be 
imposed.’”211 However, there is a plausible argument that this decision should 
be interpreted as endorsing a principle that is “intended to protect the defense, 
not the prosecution, proscribing the admission of evidence about lenient 
punishments, but not proscribing the admission of evidence about severe 																																																								
207 For instance, in New Hampshire v. Elvin Mayo, Jr. 125 N.H. 200, 204 (N.H. 1984), ,the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the legal permissibility of the trial judge’s decision 
to allow defense counsel to argue the following in his closing statement: “[I]f you find that the 
prosecution has proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element, you may, or 
should, find [the defendant] guilty. You are not required to. You must find him not guilty if 
each and every element has not been proven; you may, or should, find him guilty if each and 
every element has been proven. You don’t have to.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
found that this was legally permissible because “[t]he jury was expressly made aware of its 
prerogative to disregard the strict requirements of the law if it found that those requirements 
were not being justly applied in the defendant’s case.” Id. Notably, not all jurisdictions agree 
on this issue. In United States v. Trujillo 714 F.2d 102, 106 (11th Cir. 1983) the Eleventh 
Circuit held that “While we recognize that a jury may render a verdict at odds with the 
evidence or the law, neither the court nor counsel should encourage jurors to violate their 
oath”, and hence “defense counsel may not argue jury nullification during closing argument.” 
See also Huestis, at 89-94; Monroe H. Freedman, Jury Nullification: What It Is, and How to 
Do It Ethically 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (2014). 
208Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and Should a Jury Reject 
the Law to Do Justice? 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 251 (1993). We put aside other evidence 
that could be admitted in order to support a nullification argument in jury deliberations, such as 
irrelevant evidence that helps portray the defendant in a sympathetic light. Not all defendants 
who are subject to severe mandatory minimums have an especially sympathetic background, 
and there is strong resistance—grounded in case law—to allowing juries to hear irrelevant 
evidence.  
209 Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries of the 
Consequences of Conviction, 90 BOSTON U. L. REV. 2223 (2010) 
(http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/bellin.pdf).  
210 Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and 
Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 446 (1988). 
211 Shannon v. United States 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994). 
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punishments”.212 Moreover, there are ways to argue that evidence of the 
applicable sentences is relevant to the question of guilt. Specifically, the idea 
here is based on the “long-approved argument” employed by prosecutors who 
contend, with respect to corroborating witnesses with pending criminal 
charges, that the known prospect of a criminal sanction for perjury “supports 
an inference that the cooperating witness is less likely to have committed an 
alleged crime”.213 The same thinking suggests that criminal defendants are less 
likely to commit more serious crimes since these are punished more severely, 
and so evidence of sentencing ranges is technically relevant to the question of 
guilt and thus not inadmissible.214 Given this, we think it plausible that judges 
do not have a legal duty to exclude such evidence; admitting such evidence 
might be considered to stretch the law, but it does not violate the letter of the 
law, and hence would not obviously be legally impermissible. Thus, this 
strategy, if implemented properly, can amount to a Satisficing Option.  
 
Another legal challenge to this indirect and implicit version of suggestive 
strategies is that since the jury has no right to engage in jury nullification, 
judges should not take steps that increase the likelihood of jury nullification. 
This argument also depends on an answer to the contested question of whether 
the jury has a right to engage in jury nullification. Since we wish to take no 
stand on that issue here, we are willing to grant this premise for the sake of 
argument. Instead, we reject the inference from this premise to the conclusion 
that judges should not take steps that increase the likelihood of jury 
nullification. We think that even if they are nudged by the judge or the defense, 
the jury and its members make autonomous decisions about whether to nullify 
the law. This is a novus actus interveniens, and it severs any legal 
responsibility that judges might be thought to have over the nullification 
outcome. In other words, even if there is a causal chain from acts by the 
judiciary to nullifications by juries, the judiciary arguably is not responsible for 
the independent decision of juries to nullify. 
 
For these reasons, we think that some suggestive strategies are legally 
permissible even if they may not be legally ideal: they satisfice the legal 
reasons at play. We also think that there are good moral reasons to engage in 
this strategy. Most obviously, it can improve the defendant’s odds of avoiding 
unjustly harsh mandatory minimums. Less obviously, it provides a further 
disincentive to prosecutors who would seek to strategically apply severe 
mandatory minimums in contexts where they would not be warranted. Given 
that this strategy is available wherever severe mandatory minimum provisions 
are applied, it could provide a significant constraint on prosecutorial discretion 
even if there is significant debate about the legality of providing exculpatory 																																																								
212 Bellin, supra note 209, at 2240-41. Bellin cites Justice Stevens’ argument that nullification 
instructions are unlikely to prejudice the defendant as “as there is no need to give the 
instruction unless the defendant requests it.” Id. (citing Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 
573, 591 (1994) (Stevens J., dissenting)).  
213 Id, at 2252. 
214 Id.  
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evidence regarding the consequences of a verdict. Insofar as prosecutors aim to 
maximize their track record of “wins” and resolve trials quickly, they have 
strong incentives to both avoid nullifications on slam-dunk convictions and not 
get drawn into the time-consuming litigation of evidentiary questions. In this 
way, suggestive strategies have some of the same benefits as compelled 
cooperative strategies.  
 
III. ARE SATISFICING OPTIONS AN INTOLERABLE THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW? 
 
Perhaps the most serious objection that could be leveled against the 
strategies above is that they are not genuine Satisficing Options because of the 
risks that they pose to important rule of law values. For instance, some might 
object that these strategies could be co-opted by advocates of any possible 
conception of what justice or morality demands—even ones that to some might 
seem deeply troubling—in order to push for whatever case outcomes this or 
that judge happens to prefer. This is a familiar concern in discussions of 
judicial lawlessness: Jeffrey Brand-Ballard calls it “mimetic failure.” 215 This is 
Brand-Ballard’s term for scenarios in which one group’s at least perceived 
deviation from the accepted norms induces another group to deviate 
themselves in sub-optimal ways that mirror the behavior of the former group, 
thus leading to a breakdown of coordination around the relevant norms.216 The 
risk of mimetic failure provides an important moral argument in favor of the 
practices advocated by Legalists: They argue on this basis that courts should 
only apply the accepted legal rules, lest the courts descend into chaotic fora for 
the airing of each judge’s personal views on partisan political issues. Since this 
concern, like other concerns about the rule of law, reflects important moral 
considerations, it should be clear how it is relevant under the conceptual 
framework we provided in Part II. It can change the balance of moral reasons, 
and so what initially may have appeared to be a Satisficing Option would 
become morally impermissible, and hence not a Satisficing Option at all. 
 
As we have emphasized throughout this article, some rule of law concerns 
do arise with each strategy we consider; however, such concerns do not arise in 
each case with equal force. Consider Expressive Strategies. Say that it became 
much more common for judges like Cassell to express their outrage at the 
injustices inflicted on defendants like Weldon Angelos. This may carry some 
risk that judges more generally would express their personal views on partisan 
issues. But would that cost be so great as to render morally impermissible 
Cassell’s expressions of opposition to mandatory minimums? This seems 
doubtful. Since some of the moral significance of Expressive Strategies comes 
from how the judiciary can stimulate democratic debate, the costs of mimetic 																																																								
215 Brand-Ballard, supra note 57 at 207 (“Mimetic failure occurs when deviation by Group O 
provokes another judge to deviate in an optimal-result case. But for the latter judge’s reaction, 
the group’s deviation would not have had this negative effect.”). Similar points are made about 
justified civil disobedience more generally. See, e.g., WILLIAM SMITH, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 6-7 (2013). 
216 Brand-Ballard, supra note 57 at 207. 
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failure here do not seem prohibitive. So we think that this objection at best 
would show that some of the strategies that we have laid out are not Satisficing 
Options; we do not think it shows that there can be no Satisficing Options.   
 
More importantly, we do not think that this concern shows that any of the 
strategies that we have analyzed are flatly ruled out as Satisficing Options—for 
three reasons. First, these strategies can be restricted in simple ways that 
attenuate concerns about the erosion of rule of law values. We will continue to 
focus on mimetic failure here, though we think the same point applies for other 
rule of law worries. If the concern is that judges being influenced by their 
personal views would make the courts devolve into chaotic fora on divisive 
partisan issues, a simple fix would be to limit these strategies to issues on 
which the judiciary is united. Under this proposal, a judge can use 
Interpretative, Expressive, Assistive, Cooperative, and Suggestive Strategies 
only when her views reflect a near-consensus within the judiciary. Note that 
this would prohibit judges from using these strategies in relation to laws on 
more controversial issues like abortion or certain restrictions on speech or 
religion; but it would not prohibit judges from using these strategies in relation 
to unjust mandatory minimums. The Judicial Conference of the United States 
has opposed mandatory minimum sentencing provisions regularly and 
consistently since 1953, and as a matter of “established policy” since at least 
1962.217 Limiting the above strategies to matters where judicial bodies have a 
unified stance is one way to operationalize the idea that departures from Pure 
Obedience should be restricted to issues on which there is a broad moral 
consensus on the applicable body of law, in order to prevent mimetic failure 
and address other rule of law-based concerns.  
 
Second, even if our strategies are not restricted in their application in such 
a manner, we do not think that rule of law concerns will always outweigh other 
moral considerations. It is at least possible that the risks of mimetic failure or 
similar breakdowns could be outweighed by, say, the need to prevent or 
redress an egregious injustice to particular defendants. Proponents of the 
mimetic failure objection may disagree; they may, for instance, think that 
concerns about the rule of law are lexically prior to other moral concerns that 
the judiciary must consider. But this would require further argument. That 
there are risks like mimetic failure does not in itself show that those risks 
always dominate other moral concerns, such as those raised by the near-
certainty that Pure Obedience will condemn some low-level offenders to 
several decades of incarceration.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even if one argues that rule of law 
concerns are lexically prior to other moral concerns, we do not think that rule 																																																								
217 See Paul Cassell, Statement of Judge Paul Cassell on Behalf of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, 19 Fed. Sent. R.  5 (June 2007), http://constitutionproject.org/pdf/120.pdf 
(explaining in Part II why “the Judicial Conference has consistently opposed mandatory 
minimums for more than fifty years” and showing in Part III that “the Judicial Conference has 
considerable company in opposing mandatory minimum sentences”).   
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of law values always militate in favor of Pure Obedience. There are at least 
some cases in which strategies like the ones we described above on balance 
promote the rule of law as compared to Pure Obedience. A similar point has 
been recognized in other contexts. One famous example is Marbury v. 
Madison, which is credited with establishing the courts’ power of judicial 
review.218 The authority was at best dubious for the Supreme Court in this case 
to exercise judicial review to strike down an Act of Congress as 
unconstitutional, and so the Court’s decision in Marbury amounted merely to a 
questionable assertion of the power of judicial review.219 As such, the legality 
of the decision was far from clear. In our terminology, it was legally sub-
optimal. Nonetheless, few doubt that Marbury has enhanced the rule of law as 
we know it by enabling the judiciary to serve as a powerful check on the 
powers of Congress and the Executive.220 As such, some celebrated cases that 
on balance promoted the rule of law in part rest on what can be described as 
the deliberate use of a legally sub-optimal interpretation of a source of law—a 
plausible candidate for what we have been calling a Satisficing Option.221  
 
The same may well be true in at least some judicial dilemmas that the 
courts face today. That may be particularly true in areas where legal doctrine 																																																								
218 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
219 Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes 
for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20 (2008) (noting that Marbury 
v. Madison’s assumption of the right to declare legislation unconstitutional has been described 
with some justification as ‘a political coup of the first magnitude.’”); Christopher L. Eisgruber, 
Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of Constitutional Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203 (“In 
Marbury, Marshall exercised judicial review in a way that seems, at least in hindsight, more 
political than legal. For example, his opinion relied upon a highly contestable construction of 
Article III of the United States Constitution.”). 
220 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1614 (1997) (“In cases as early and prominent as Marbury v. Madison, 
courts have taken a leading role in upholding the rule of law by creating remedies against 
unlawful government action.”). At least this is the traditional view.  Robert M. Casale, 
Revisiting One of the Law’s Great Fallacies: Marbury v. Madison, 89 CONN. B.J. 62 (2015) 
(“Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury is credited with incorporating the doctrine of judicial 
review into American constitutional law, and thereby elevating the Supreme Court to the role 
of guardian of the Constitution.”). However, the actual impact of Marbury in genuinely 
establishing the power of judicial review has been questioned by legal historians. See, e.g., id. 
at 63-64; Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The Emergence 
of a “Great Case”, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003) (noting that “[b]etween 1803 and 
1887, the Supreme Court never once cited Marbury for the principle of judicial review,” and 
arguing that Marbury didn’t become a “great case” until the late 19th century when “proponents 
of an expansive doctrine of judicial review have needed it to assume greatness”). Nonetheless, 
the traditional view of Marbury still serves to illustrate at least the possibility of legally sub-
optimal actions promoting the rule of law. The actual impact of one specific case does not alter 
our fundamental point.  
221 See also Jeffrey Denys Goldsworthy, The Limits of Judicial Fidelity to Law: The Oxford 
Lecture, 24 CANADIAN J. L. AND JURISPRUDENCE 316 (2011) (arguing that “[i]t is widely 
believed that Chief Justice John Marshall lied in the famous American case of Marbury v. 
Madison, in which the doctrine of judicial review of legislation was firmly established for the 
first time. It is not that he lied about that doctrine; rather, the claim is that he lied about the 
meaning of a statute, by adopting an absurd interpretation of it, in order to raise the question of 
judicial review”). 
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directly concerns rule of law constraints on the executive, as well as 
administrative and constitutional law.222 But it is also plausible in relation to 
our focal case of judicial dilemmas that arise due to the use or threatened use 
of mandatory minimums in criminal trials. One reason why the judiciary is 
mostly united in its opposition to many mandatory minimums is precisely that 
such provisions threaten to undermine the rule of law by transferring discretion 
from the judiciary to prosecutors,223 and generating prohibitive costs to the 
exercise of the constitutional right to trial by jury.224 As a result, Satisficing 
Options—if used judiciously—could end up promoting the rule of law on 
balance. The extent to which this is true for particular Satisficing Options must 
of course be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but we hope to have shown that 
this is at least a live possibility that is worth taking seriously. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Judicial dilemmas seem likely to become increasingly pressing in the 
context of cases involving low-level criminal offenders like Weldon Angelos 
or unlawful long-term immigrants like Magana Ortiz. Despite this, the ethics of 
judicial dilemmas remains neglected in jurisprudence and philosophy. Our 
intention has not been to settle the debate about what judges should do in such 
cases; rather, we have sought to stimulate that debate by showing that the 
choice between the legalist’s strategy of pure obedience and the moralist’s 
strategy of disobedience is often a false dichotomy. While judges frequently 																																																								
222 For instance, one could imagine the rule of law being strengthened by judicial efforts to 
curtail presidential pardons for contempt of court convictions, even if this is done through a 
permissible but legally sub-optimal route. Such limits on the presidential pardon power could 
help ensure that courts can compel legal officers to act in accordance with the constitution 
through contempt of court charges. Of course, how effective this would be as a way to 
strengthen the rule of law would also depend on empirical issues, including how likely it is to 
provoke “mimetic failure.” See supra note 215. 
223 See, e.g., Erik Luna and Paul Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 13 
(2010) (“Mandatory minimums effectively transfer sentencing authority from trial judges to 
federal prosecutors, who may pre-set punishment through creative investigative and charging 
practices, producing troubling punishment differentials among offenders with similar 
culpability.”); id. at 70 (arguing that this practice undermines the “independent role of judges 
in sentencing” via the “effective transfer of that power to the executive branch” (internal 
citations omitted)). See also references therein. For an in-depth discussion of the considerable 
role that this transfer of power to prosecutors seems to have played in relation to mass 
incarceration, see John Pfaff’s interesting new book. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE CAUSES 
OF MASS INCARCERATION 127-160 (2017). 
224 See Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force 
Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty (2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-
cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead (providing a detailed 
study of this of “trial penalty”). As Judge Rakoff has argued, one result of this trial penalty is 
that 2–8% of convicted felons who plead guilty are estimated to be innocent. See Jed S. 
Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (November 20, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ (asking 
“[h]ow prevalent is the phenomenon of innocent people pleading guilty,” and noting that 
“criminologists…estimate that the overall rate for convicted felons as a whole is between 2 
percent and 8 percent”). 	
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face decisions involving a serious tension between the applicable moral and 
legal reasons, they can still seek options that are good enough by the lights of 
both morality and law. That is, they can seek Satisficing Options along the 
lines of the strategies we discussed above. In doing so, they can avoid the 
worst features of both the moralist and legalist options. Satisficing Options 
need not substantially undermine the rule of law; yet they still help to prevent, 
or at least ameliorate, serious injustices done at the hands of the law.   
 
Judge Reinhardt began with the powerful observation that among the 
victims in unjust legal outcomes in cases like Ortiz “are judges who, forced to 
participate in such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and humanity as 
well”, and he concluded: “I concur as a judge, but as a citizen I do not”. In 
defending Satisficing Options as a way to resolve judicial dilemmas, our hope 
has been to identify ways in which judges can carry out their legal duties 
without suffering a loss of dignity and humanity, and thereby concur not only 
as a judge, but also as a citizen.   
